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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal from 
the final order in hunt v. Lance, Civil No. 020500612 dated May 11, 2006 pursuant to 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court error by ruling sua sponte on the issue of abandonment 
despite the fact that the issue was not raised by either party or tried before the court? 
2. Did the trial court error by limiting the prescriptive easement to twenty feet 
in width when its findings of fact specifically state the width of the Lane is 34 feet across 
and when it limited the length of the Lane to 180 feet when the testimony of the parties 
indicated the length of the Lane was between 235 and 247 feet. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Issues on Appeal: 
Issue 1: Whether Judge Schofield erred by not granting a new trial because of 
alleged bias by the trial judge is an issue Utah appellate courts review only for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, Tf 8 (Utah 2000) (we review decision to grant or 
deny motion for new trial only for abuse of discretion). 
Issue 2: The question of whether the elements of a prescriptive easement were met 
by clear and convincing evidence is a highly fact-intensive issue for which trial courts are 
granted broad discretion. An appellate court will overturn the trial courts findings only if 
--i-
there is an abuse of this broad discretion. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 
1998). 
Issue 3: A trial court is given broad discretion in making factual findings based on 
the witness testimony. As such, these findings will only be reversed if they are found to 
be "clearly erroneous." 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, % 49 (Utah 
2004). 
II. Issues on Cross-Appeal: 
Issue 1: The issues of whether the trial court erred when it ruled on the issue of 
abandonment and if its application of abandonment was correct are questions of law, 
which are reviewed for correctness. Green River Canal Co. v. Olds (In re Gen. 
Determination of Rights to the Use of Water), 2004 UT 106 ^ 16 (UT 2004). 
Issue 2: The issue of limiting an easement is a question of the scope of the 
easement, a finding of fact for which great deference is given to the trial court in its 
findings. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); McBride v. McBride, 581 
P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978). Therefore, a trial court will be overturned only if it exceeds 
its broad discretion. Id. 
Ill 
III 
III 
III 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. In 2002, Garth Lunt, Trustee ("Mr. Lunt") brought suit against Harold and 
I 
Diane Lance ("the Lances"), in the Fourth District Court. The Lances countersued 
asserting numerous causes of action. The only issues remaining at trial were claims for 
boundary by acquiescence and prescriptive easement. (R. at 621). 
2. These two issues were heard by the Fourth Judicial District Court Wasatch 
County, State of Utah during bench trial held on November 1-2, 2005. (R. at 729-730). 
The Trial Court found that Mr. Lunt established a prescriptive easement by clear and 
convincing evidence. (R. at 729-30.) The boundary by acquiescence claims were 
dismissed. Id. 
3. On March 24, 2006, nearly five (5) months after the trial, the Lances filed a 
Motion and Affidavit for a Rule 63(b) Removal of Judge. (R. at 791). On the first day of 
trial, Judge Pullan noted that he was consulted about a boundary line issue in his capacity 
as the County Attorney and that he had no recollection with whom he'd spoken. (R. at 
841.) Both parties "made an affirmative determination at that time that they had no 
concerns about a possible conflict of interest." Id. Through subsequent research, the 
Lances discovered that the property came before the Heber City Planning Commission for 
a requested zone change and that Judge Pullan was the acting chair of the commission 
that recommended a zone change requested by Moneves Boren. Id. Ms. Boren 
subsequently testified as a witness during the bench trial. Id. Judge Taylor ruled that 
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Rule 63 was not appropriate and declined to set aside the Judge Pullan's ruling or the 
trial, but provided that Judge Schofield should handle further proceedings as necessary in 
order to avoid the appearance of impropriety. (Id. at 839-40). 
4. On May 25, 2006, the Lances moved for new trial or in the alternative to 
amend judgment or take additional testimony based on Rule 59 and Rule 60, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. (R. at 892). Judge Schofield denied the motion under Rule 59 stating 
that Judge Pullan had the responsibility to "judge the credibility of competing witness 
testimony" and then make decisions. (R. at 932). Judge Schofield further determined that 
Judge Pullan's involvement with the planning commission "did not create a bias or 
prejudice which justifies a new trial in this matter." Id. Judge Schofield further denied 
relief to the Lances under Rule 60(b) for failing "to state a reason that justifies relief and 
ruling that the Lances' " 'sincere and compelling belief that plaintiff in fact did not use 
the Lane in the manner asserted by plaintiffs witnesses and found by the Court' is 
insufficient to justify relief." Id. 
5. The final judgment which established a prescriptive easement and denied 
the boundary by acquiescence was signed by the Court on May 11, 2006. (R. 846-843). 
6. On January 8, 2007, the Lances filed their Amended Notice of Appeal from 
the judgment and orders entered by the Court on May 11, 2006. (R. 946). 
/// 
/// 
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S1A1LMLN1 OFRELKVAM *AC1S 
1. Mr. Garth Lunt (Mr. Lunt) owns property at 205 North 600 West. (R. 958 
at 131). 
2. Mr. Lunt is successor in interest to Lincoln McNaughten and his family (the 
"McNaughtens"). Lincoln McNaughten was the step-father of Jack Lunt, Monaves 
Boren, and Garth Lunt (trustee of the Plaintiff trust). (R. 958 at 131-132). 
3. The Lances own the property immediately south of the Mr. Lunt's property. 
They acquired it in 1991. (R. 959 at 205). 
4. The Lances are successors in interest to Frank Witt and his Family ("the 
Witts"). (R.958). 
5. Between these two properties is the Lane which gives rise to this dispute. 
(R. 958). 
6. Mr. Eldon Carlisle testified that in the 1920's and 1930's, the McNaughtens, 
used the Lane to drive their cattle to and access their back acreage. Mr. Carlisle testified 
that he helped the McNaughten's run cows down the Lane during the 1930's. R. 958 at 
126-127. 
7. Mr. Carlisle testified that the Lane was used as a driveway as early as the 
late 1920's. (R. 958 at 127). 
8. Mr. Carlisle testified that after he returned from military service in 1946, 
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the McNaughtens continued to run cattle down the Lane as they had previously. He 
recalled seeing the McNaughtens use the Lane in this manner through the 1950?s and up 
until the early 1990fs. (R. 958 at 119, 128). 
9. Mr. Carlisle testified that neither the Witts nor the McNaughtens ever 
objected to the use of the Lane by the other. (R. 958 at 118, 121). 
10. The Lances' witness Mr. Duane C. Smith, who testified he drove cattle for 
the McNaughtens as a child in the late 1930's and worked for them during the 1940fs 
stated he never took the McNaughten's cows down the Lane. (R. 959 at 248). 
11. The Lances' witness Mr. Duane Smith testified that at one time the Lunts 
used a different access to their properly other than just the Lane. (R. 959 at 253). 
12. After weighing the testimony, the trial court found that "Mr. Eldon 
Carlisle's testimony concerning use of the Lane from the 1930's to the 1950's was 
particularly credible." (R. 728). 
13. Ms. Monaves Boren testified that from the late 1940's the Lane was used by 
her parents, the McNaughtens, to park cars and move cows and equipment up and down 
the Lane. (R. 958 at 64). 
14. From 1950 to 1955 Ms. Boren assisted her parents in milking and driving 
the cows and harvesting hay. (R. 958 at 62). Both families continued to use the Lane and 
park their cars on the Lane throughout that time. Ms. Boren also testified that use of the 
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Lane to put cattle in the rear pastures of the Lunt property has not stopped to her 
knowledge. (R. 958 at 64). 
15. Jack Lunt testified that the McNaughtens and Witts used the Lane without 
permission from each other, to move equipment, mowing machines, and deliver)7 rakes to 
and from the rear acreage of the property. (R. 958 at 14). 
16. Jack Lunt also testified that the McNaughtens and Lunts moved cattle back 
and forth on the Lane and took bob sleighs and wagons down the Lane. (R. 958 at 30). 
17. The Lances' witness, Ms. Frankie Housel testified that the Lane was used 
as a driveway to the Witt's property. (R. 959 at 264). 
18. Garth Lunt testified that the Lane had existed "forever, as far as [he] knew." 
(R. 958 at 134). He testified that after 1954, he observed the Lane being used by the 
Witt's and himself for hauling hay to their respective barns, moving farm equipment, 
moving cattle, and recalls the Lane was used for these and other ingress/egress purposes. 
(R. 958 at 138). He testified that these uses were made of the property until the early 
1990's. Id. 
19. Mr. Garth Lunt testified that the Lane provided agricultural and residential 
access the McNaughten's, and subsequently Mr. Lunt's properly and was mutually used 
by the Witts, McNaughtens, and Mr. Lunt and his siblings to access the property through 
at least the 1990's. (R. 958 at 68-70). 
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20. Sometime in the mid to late 1980's, Mr. Lunt began leasing the 
McNaughten home and accessory apartment to tenants. From that time to the present, the 
tenants leasing the property have continually used the Lane as a driveway to access the 
back apartment. (R. 958 at 91, 182-183). Mr. Lunt also testified that the Lane has been 
used to put cattle on the back property "to this day." (R. 958 at 182). 
21. Ms. Boren testified the Lane was 35 feet in width. (R. 958 at 66). 
22. Mr. Garth Lunt testified the Lane was 34 to 35 feet in width. 
(R. 958 at 135-136). 
23. The Lances' witness Mr. Duane Smith testified the Lane was about 40 feet 
in width. (R. 959 at 258). 
24. The Lances' witness, Ms. Frankie Housel (the Witt's granddaughter), who 
did not physically measure the Lane testified the length of the Lane was approximately 
200 feet from the grainery, which was located a distance up the Lane next to the Witt 
home. (R. 959 at 264-267). 
25. According to Lance's witness Frank Pia, who did not physically measure 
the easement, it appeared to him from photographs that the length of the Lane was 
approximately 150-175 feet. (R. 959 at 322). 
26. According to Lances' witness Duane Smith, who was basing the length of 
the Lane from his memory, the length of the easement was approximately 150-200 feet 
from 6th West to the barn. (R. 959 at 258). 
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27. Ms. Boren testified that she personally rn.easu.red the Lane and the length of 
the Lane was approximately 235 feet from the edge of the asphalt on 6th West to the end 
of the Lane where the McNaughtens and the Lunts accessed the rear acreage of their 
property. (R. 958 at 67-68). 
28. Jack Lunt testified that he personally measured the Lane and the length of 
the Lane was approximately 247 feet from the road back to the barn and access to the rear 
acreage of the property. (R. 958 at 29). 
29. Garth Lunt testified that a fence ran alongside the Lane and a 10 foot gate at 
the end of the fence allowed them to enter the Lunt barn and property. He testified that 
the Lane terminated at the old Witt barn at the end of the Lane. (R. 958 at 136, 186.) 
30. Garth Lunt testified that he personally measured the Lane from the road to 
the end of the Lane and the length of the Lane equaled ; feet (160 ft+15 ft+62 ft+10 
ft). (R. 958 at 185-186). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. Summary of Arguments In Response to Appeal 
The Lances allegations of perceived bias are insufficient to warrant a new trial in 
this case. Judge Pullan's involvement as vice-chair of the Heber City Planning 
Commission prior to admittance to the bench is by itself not evidence of actual prejudice 
and thus demonstrative of bias sufficient for a new trial. See State v. Alonzo, 973 P 2d 
975, 979 (Utah 1998). The Lances fail to demonstrate that Judge Pullan took any 
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"extreme" actions or exhibited a "deep-seated antagonism" toward them, and therefore 
fail to allege bias sufficient to warrant a new trial. See State Interest ofM.L., 965 P.2d 
551, 556 (Utah Ct.App. 1998). 
The trial courts finding that Mr. Lunt holds a prescriptive easement cannot be 
overturned. Trial courts are granted broad discretion to in easement cases because they 
are fact intensive decisions and trial courts are in the best decision to hear, weigh, and 
determine whether testimony is clear and convincing. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 
1256 (Utah 1998). They can only be overturned if they exceed this broad discretion. Id, 
The trial court did not exceed its broad discretion in this case. The testimony of the 
witnesses was clear and convincing that Mr. Lunt and his predecessors openly, 
notoriously, and adversely used the Lane for more than twenty years. Mar chant v. Park 
City, 788 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990). The Lances fail to marshal evidence that proves 
otherwise. See Hogle v. Zinetics Med, Inc., 2002 UT 121, \ 16 (Utah 2002). 
II. Summary of Arguments on Cross-Appeal 
The trial court erred by ruling on the issue of abandonment when that issue was not 
raised or tried before the court. In Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns Inc, the 
Supreme Court precludes trial court's from "granting of relief on issues neither raised nor 
tried." 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984). In this case, the issue of abandonment was not 
raised in the pleadings or the trial court, the Lances failed to raise the issue, and the Mr. 
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Lunt did • »ve sufficient notice for the trial court to rule on this issue. See Cowley v. 
Porter, 2005 UT App 518 (UT Ct.App. 2005). 
Even if this Court were to find the trial court was within its authority to rule on the 
issue of abandonment, the elements of abandonment were not met. While an easement 
may be abandoned in Utah, Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 
(Utah 1977), an intent to abandon and actual abandonment of an easement must be 
demonstrated by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence for the trial court to declare 
an easement abandoned. State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84 f^ 14 (Utah 2005) (citing Linscomb 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 199 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir. 1952)); see also Lucky Seven 
Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 753 (UT App. 1988). The Lances failed to raise, let 
alone prove by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that Mr. Lunt (1) 
demonstrated an intent to abandon his easement in the Lane; and (2) actually abandoned 
the Lane. 
ARGUMENT 
(RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS ItKIF.F) 
The Lances appeal three issues: (1) The denial of their motion for a new trial based 
on grounds that the trial judge was not impartial because he acted as chair of the Heber 
City Planning Commission when the commission changed the zoning on the subject 
property in 1998; (2) the trial court did not apply the proper test for prescriptive 
easements; and (3) the Lances' witnesses were more credible than the Plaintiff Mr. Lunt's 
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and therefore the trial court's decision that Mr. Lunt's witnesses established an easement 
by clear and convincing evidence was wrong. 
The trial judge was an impartial finder of facts in this case. Near the beginning of 
trial, Judge Pullan raised the issue of his recollection of prior experience with the property 
with the Lances and Mr. Lunt. Neither party objected to his continued presence on the 
case or sought to disqualify him at that time. In regards to the second issue, the record 
supports the trial court's finding that a prescriptive easement existed by clear and 
convincing evidence. Finally, in response to the last issue, a trial judge is granted broad 
discretion in determining the credibility of witnesses. Simply because the Lances 
disagree with the trial court's determination of credibility does not make Lunt's witnesses 
less credible or the findings of fact less clear and convincing. 
Mr. Lunt on cross-appeal also requests review of the trial court's finding of 
abandonment and of the final length and width of the prescriptive easement ordered by 
the trial court. 
L WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING THE APPELLANTS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND 
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE PULLAN. 
The Utah Supreme Court will not find a trial court has abused its discretion and 
grant a new trial based on allegations of perceived bias alone. See Edgell v. Canning, 
1999 UT 21, Tj 12 (Utah 1999). In Utah, judges are presumed to be qualified. In re 
Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 1997) (citing 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 218 
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(1994)). They also are not required to hear a case with no existing personal biases or 
opinions. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, "[although litigants are entitled to a 
judge who will hear both sides and decide an issue on the merits of the law and the 
evidence presented, they are not entitled to a judge whose mind is a clean slate." Madsen 
v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1988). In other words, it is 
neither possible nor recommended for a judge leave a "lifetime of experiences" and the 
opinions and attitudes generated therefrom in his or her chambers before taking the 
bench. Id. at 546. 
One party's alleged bias by the trial court cannot be based solely on the fact that a 
judge has issued prior rulings adverse to the party making the allegation. See In re 
Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d at 1154 (stating '"no deduction of bias and prejudice may be 
made from adverse rulings by a judge.'") (quoting 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 219 (1994)). 
Instead, such bias can be shown to exist only if "apart from [the judge's] analysis of the 
issues of fact or law [in those prior proceedings], he had such a bias in favor of one party 
or prejudice against the other that he could not fairly and impartially determine the 
issues." See State Interest ofM.L, 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct.App. 1998)(quoting 
Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 742 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). Indeed, for assertions of bias 
to meet the standard warranting a new trial, the asserting party must demonstrate that the 
judge demonstrated "extreme" actions and a "deep-seated antagonism" against them in 
the prior proceedings such that he or she cannot "fairly and impartially determine the 
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issues. Id. The Supreme Court held in the Edgell v. Canning case, a case with a similar 
fact pattern, that error based on the trial court's perceived bias will not be presumed. 
Edgell v. Canning, 1999 UT 21, If 12 (Utah 1999). 
Finally, it is a well-recognized rule that an application for the disqualification of a 
trial judge must be filed a the earliest opportunity. Madsen, 756 P.2d at 543. Therefore, 
when a trial judge discloses personal experience with or participation in previous 
proceedings involving the parties, any affected party, if they so desire, should 
immediately object to continuing the proceedings, or at the very least ask for a 
continuance to consider disqualification. Id. 
A. The Lances' Allegations Fail to Demonstrate Facts that Any Bias or 
Actual Prejudice Was Shown. In Addition, the Lances Made No 
Objection To Judge Pullan Staying on the Case. 
The Lances' allegations of bias are based solely on a previous decision made by 
the Heber City Planning Commission that affected the zoning on the subject property. 
Judge Pullan was a member of this commission prior to being admitted to the bench. 
However, prior experience with the subject property as the acting chair of a seven-
member planning commission is insufficient for the Lances' allegations of bias to warrant 
a new trial. The zoning decision was made on September 24, 1998 and does not 
demonstrate any hint of bias. R. 767. The minutes of the meeting reveal that Monaves 
Moren requested to change the zoning on the property from RA-2 to R-2 zoning. R. 766. 
No one attended to speak against her request. Id. Commission member Harry Zane made 
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a motion to approve the zone change, the motion was seconded by Sherman Christen, 
another Commission member, and the motion carried unanimously. Id, The fact that 
Judge Pullan was a member of this seven-member committee before he was even 
admitted to the bench does not demonstrate any bias toward the Lances. 
The Lances have not alleged or raised any facts to demonstrate that Judge Pullan 
engaged in any "extreme" actions or demonstrated udeep-seated antagonism" toward 
them in this previous interaction. See State Interest ofM.L., 965 P.2d at 556 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1998). To the contrary, the only allegation maintained by the Lances is that 
Judge Pullan was acting chairman1 of the commission that made a zoning decision 
regarding the property. The Lances cite to State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 
1998) in support of the proposition that appearance of bias may be grounds for reversal if 
actual prejudice is shown." However, as previously stated, the Lances fail to allege actual 
prejudice. Mere involvement on a seven-member planning commission eight years prior 
to trial is not actual prejudice. They have presented no evidence of bias. On its own, this 
involvement fails to demonstrate the seven-member commission's unanimous decision 
creates some sort of judicial bias in the underlying dispute. 
In addition, no objection was raised by the Lances when informed of this prior 
experience. When Judge Pullan, on his own accord, noted to the parties that he recalled 
1
 Judge Pullan was the vice-chairman of the commission. He conducted the vote in this 
case because the Chairman did not arrive until a few minutes after the vote had been taken after 
which time the chairman took over the meeting. See R. 766. 
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dealing with a boundary line issue on the subject property in the past (R. 958 58:17-21), 
the Lances neither objected to continuing the proceedings nor requested a continuance to 
consider disqualifying Judge Pullan.2 See Madsen at 543. Instead, Lances' counsel, who 
conferred with his clients prior to speaking, stated "My clients have not been involved 
with you. They don't recognize you. They don't recall anything like that. All their 
property is in Heber City, so I don't know if you had jurisdiction (inaudible)." R. 958 at 
59:9-12. The Lances should have objected against proceeding with trial or requested a 
continuance to consider disqualification at that time. Apparently it was not an issue then 
and because they have failed to demonstrate any actual bias, the Lances' mere allegations 
of bias at this late juncture are insufficient to warrant a new trial. 
B. The Lances Allegations of Bias Were Heard By Both Judge Taylor and 
Judge Schofield, Who Both Denied the Allegations and Refused to 
Overturn Judge Pullan's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Regardless, the Lances were able to address their concern of bias to different 
judges on two separate occasions: (1) in their rule 63(b)(2) Motion to Disqualify Judge 
Pullan which was heard by Judge Taylor; and (2) in their Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial 
heard by Judge Schofield. Judge Taylor, while accepting Mrs. Lances' affidavit alleging 
bias as requisite certification under rule 63, refused to overturn the findings and turned 
2
 In their statement of the case paragraph 3, the Lances on appeal cite to the record at 958 
p. 58 and assert that Judge Pullan stated he was familiar with the property, having been involved 
in a "boundary dispute" while serving as county attorney. This is misstates the record. Judge 
Pullan never stated he was party to a "boundary dispute." It was his recollection that he " was 
consulted about a boundary line issue," something far different from a "boundary dispute." 
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the case over to Judge Schofield simply to avoid "the appearance of impropriety" that 
could remotely be inferred if Judge Pullan continued with the trial. See R. at 839. 
However, when the issue of bias sufficient to warrant a new trial was heard by 
Judge Schofield, he firmly denied the Lances' allegations of bias on the following 
grounds: 
[Judge Pullan's] involvement as a member of the planning commission did not 
create a bias or prejudice which justifies a new trial in this matter. As Chairman of 
the planning commission, Judge Pullan was one of several members of that body 
who dealt with the issue of [the] property. He did not act alone. Additionally, at 
the beginning of the trial Judge Pullan remembered his previous involvement with 
[the] property and asked the parties if they objected to his trying the case. At that 
time, neither party objected. Having failed to object at that time, when the issue 
was squarely addressed to the parties by Judge Pullan, [the Lances] cannot now be 
heard to complain. Judge Pullan's involvement with the plaintiffs property does 
not warrant a new trial. 
R. 932-31. In their Rule 59 motion, the Lances could not cite to any clear or convincing 
evidence that any hint of bias existed and their request for a new trial was properly 
denied. Their argument on appeal remains unchanged. They are unable to produce any 
facts sufficient to demonstrate any actual or implied bias in this case and their request on 
appeal for a new trial is not warranted and should be denied. 
The Lances' unchanged allegations of bias based solely on the fact that Judge 
Pullan served as acting chairman of the Heber City Planning Commission prior to his 
appointment to the bench are insufficient to warrant a new trial. The fact that the trial 
court issued a ruling adverse to the Lances interests does not show "deep-seated 
-17-
antagonism" or even prejudice. See State Interest ofM.L., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah 
CtApp. 1998). 
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN IT'S BROAD 
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY 
AND CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED THE EXISTENCE OF A 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. 
A. Standard of Review 
The finding of a prescriptive easement is a conclusion of law in which a trial court 
is granted broad discretion. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). While 
typically courts of appeal review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, 
according the trial court no legal deference, the standard of review for a prescriptive 
easement is different. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "such a finding is the type 
of highly fact-dependant question, with numerous potential fact patterns, which accords 
the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying the correct legal standard to 
the given set of facts. Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256. Therefore, the finding of an easement 
will only be overturned if the appellate court finds that the trial judge's decision exceeded 
the broad discretion granted. Id. (emphasis added). Great deference is granted in the 
easement context because trial judges have close proximity to the parties, the witnesses, 
the exhibits and the trial. Id. In addition, trial judges are better able to weigh conflicting 
evidence and decide what weight is to be given to the testimony of those witnesses that 
testify at trial. See Pollesche v. TransAmerican Insurance Co., 497 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 
1972). The trial court, having reviewed the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits 
-18-
produced at trial, correctly ruled that the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated 
the existence of a prescriptive easement in the Lane. 
B. The Elements for a Prescriptive Easement Were Met by the Testimony 
of the Witnesses and the Exhibits Entered Into Evidence. 
The elements of a prescriptive easement are met when the party claiming a 
prescriptive easement can prove that use of another's land was open, continuous, and 
adverse under a claim of right for a period of twenty years. Mar chant v. Park City, 788 
P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990) (citing Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984)). The 
evidence to establish a prescriptive easement must be clear and convincing. Mar chant v. 
Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). In this case, the trial court correctly 
found that the evidence was clear and convincing that use of the Lane was open, 
notorious, and adverse for over twenty years, thus meeting this standard. Therefore, the 
trial court's decision regarding the existence of a prescriptive easement should be 
affirmed. 
Where adjoining property owners, or their predecessors, jointly establish and use a 
Lane or driveway, this use meets the requirement of being open, notorious, adverse and 
continuous if done for a period of 20 years and establishes a prescriptive right to its 
continued use. Ortonv. Carter, 920 P.2d 1254, 1259 (Utah 1998). Testimony presented 
by the witnesses shows the open, notorious and adverse use of the Lane by the 
McNaughtens and Lunts for at least twenty years. In fact, the testimony from Plaintiffs 
witnesses and the property pictures entered into evidence as exhibits, demonstrate open, 
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notorious and adverse use of the Lane in its current location for over eighty (80) years, 
from the late 1920's to the present. Testimony from Mr. Eldon Carlisle, which the trial 
court noted was "was particularly credible," established that the Lane existed and was in 
use by Mr. Lunt's predecessors the McNaughtens and the Lances' predecessors in 
interest, the Witts, from the 1920?s and 1930's through the 1950fs. See R. 958 at 114-127; 
see also R. 728. As the testimony of Monaves Boren shows, the Lane was used as a 
driveway for agricultural and residential purposes from the 1940fs to the present. R. 59-
112; see also R. 737-732. The trial judge listened to the testimony of the witnesses, 
reviewed the pictures of the Lane over the years, evaluated and weighed the evidence, and 
found that there was clear and convincing of the existence of a prescriptive easement. 
Mr. Lunt and his predecessors have openly, notoriously, and adversely used the Lane for 
at least eighty years. 
As in the Orton case where the Utah Supreme Court found the existence of a 
prescriptive easement, the facts presented at trial in this case showed a common use of the 
road by the parties predecessors starting in the 1920's. In his findings, Judge Pullan 
wrote: 
The Defendant's contend that use of the Lane by the McNaughtens was by 
permission, and therefore not adverse to Witts' interests. Ms. Housel testified that 
her Grandfather Witt was "particular about protecting the Lane." However, the 
weight of the evidence demonstrates clearly and convincingly otherwise. 
R. at 729. The trial court correctly found that the evidence presented before it clearly and 
convincingly demonstrated that Mr. Lunt and his predecessors' the McNaughtens use of 
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the Lane was open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for a period of at least 
twenty years. See Marchant v. Park CityJSS P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990). 
C. Conflicting Evidence Does Not Prevent the Trial Court From Finding 
That The Existence of a Prescriptive Easement Was Clear and 
Convincing. 
While the Lances are correct that conflicting evidence was presented before the 
trial court, this is the nature of the judicial system, and conflicting evidence alone is 
insufficient grounds for dismissal. See State v. Robbins, 142 P.3d 589 (Utah App. 2006). 
Conflicting evidence and even witness testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion 
does not justify the reversal of judgement because it is the " exclusive province of the trial 
judge. ..to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon 
which a determination depends." Id, (citing People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1342 
(1975)) (emphasis added). 
The assertion by the Lances that the contradictory evidence presented by their 
witnesses proves the evidence for a prescriptive easement could not be clear and 
convincing is without merit. It undermines the broad discretion granted to a trial court in 
weighing the testimony, exhibits, and other evidence accordingly. It also fails to 
recognize that every trial has contradictory evidence by the very nature of the judicial 
system. The Lances' argument for the granting of a new trial is that contradictory 
evidence was presented and therefore the trial court could not satisfy the clear and 
convincing standard necessary to show the existence of a prescriptive easement. Without 
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a showing that the trial court abused its broad discretion, conflicting evidence is not 
grounds for reversal, therefore this argument fails to meet the standard of reversal. See 
Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256; see also State v. Robbins, 142 P.3d 589 (Utah App. 2006). 
In addition, their reliance on the record to support their arguments is misplaced . 
The record is clear and convincing that a prescriptive easement exists. For example, the 
Lances cite the record at page 61 stating "Ms. Boren testified that she did not work on 
the farm at the property in question" and page 90, that Ms. Boren "did not use the Lane in 
the milking of cows" as evidence that her testimony is contradictory and self-serving, and 
as evidence that the Lane was not used as she testified. See Appellant's Brief at 21. The 
Lances' misinterpret the record. Ms. Boren did not testify she "did not work on the 
farm," she stated "I did not work the farm." R. at 61. This statement is true but 
irrelevant. Ms. Boren did not "work the farm." As she later testifies, the farm belonged 
to her step-father Link McNaughten, who worked his own farm. She does testify that she 
worked on the farm. She milked cows on the land (R. at 61), lived at the property (R. at 
60), she and her husband helped Link gather his hay (R. at 61), she was very familiar with 
the subject property (R. at 63), and she was familiar with the Lane at the heart of this 
dispute (R. at 63:24-64:1). The fact that she did not plow the fields, plant the seeds, 
irrigate the hay, and run the hay rake herself, or in other words "work the farm," fails to 
demonstrate that her testimony is self-serving. This testimony does not deal with the time 
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of use, method of use, or scope of the Lane and does not support the Lances' argument 
that the evidence is not clear and convincing . 
Disturbingly, the Lances also try to paint Mr. Carlisle as an interested party to this 
case by stating the Lunt's predecessors were his parents. See Appellant's Brief at p. 22. 
This assertion is unsubstantiated by the record and is completely irrelevant to this appeal. 
In addition, the Lances' testimony that Mr. Carlisle's testimony was "directly contradicted 
by two disinterested witnesses of Defendant, Duane Smith and Frankie HouseP'and as 
such cannot be "clear and convincing" is unsupported. It is a trial court's province to 
weigh the conflicting evidence and decide whether it is clear and convincing. See 
Pollesche v. Trans American Insurance Co., 497 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1972). 
As further evidence that the testimony was not clear and convincing, the Lances 
claim that the McNaughtens could not have parked their cars on the Lane because there 
was no garage and the apartment wasn't built until 1985, meaning the McNaughtens and 
Lunts would have parked on their own property. See Appellant's Brief p. 22. This 
argument is irrelevant. It assumes that the McNaughtens parked their car where the 
existing garage is and not on the Lane. This was not established and therefore is 
irrelevant to this appeal. In a similar vein, the Lances argue that testimony of a fence 
three to four feet from the edge of the McNaughten house demonstrates the McNaughtens 
and Lunts accessed their property not by the Lane, but on their own property. Therefore, 
evidence asserting otherwise cannot be "clear and convincing." See Appellant's brief at 
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25-26. This too is an irrelevant argument. The trial court heard the testimony of use of 
the Lane, saw exhibits of photographs of the Lane being used in its current location, and 
weighed the evidence accordingly. In addition, the Lance's remaining arguments that 
testimony showed other access to the property at one time and "defendant's witnesses 
were at least as credible as Plaintiffs witnesses, and arguably more so" are equally 
unsupported and irrelevant. The trial court is granted great discretion in those findings 
and the weight of the evidence was in favor of Mr. Lunt. Contradictory testimony does 
not preclude a trial court from making a finding of an easement that is clear and 
convincing. 
Both Judge Pullan and Judge Schofield addressed the Lances' argument that the 
trial court was precluded from making a clear and convincing finding of an easement 
because this finding was "directly contradicted" by the evidence presented by their 
witnesses. Judge Schofield was more specific in addressing the Lances argument that 
conflicting evidence precludes the clear and convincing standard from being met. After 
citing to Judge Pullan's findings of fact and conclusion of law discussing the credibility 
of Mr. Carlisle and the aforementioned quote, he stated: 
That contradictory evidence was presented throughout the trial does not mean that 
the evidence in favor of granting the prescriptive easement was not clear and 
convincing. Every trial contains contradictory evidence. That is the nature of the 
adversarial legal system. It is the primary responsibility of the trial judge to weigh 
and judge the credibility of competing witness testimony and make decisions 
thereon. Defendant's "sincere and compelling belief that the trial judge made an 
incorrect ruling does not warrant a new trial. 
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R. at 932. In addition, the argument that the testimony is self-serving is not demonstrated 
by the record as the Lances contend. Mr. Carlisle, who the trial court found "particularly 
credible" (R. at 728) has no interest in the property and the Lances can point to nothing 
which demonstrates the testimony of Ms. Boren, Jack Lunt, and Garth Lunt was 
completely self-serving. 
III. WHETHER THE COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING THAT CURRENT USE OF THE EASEMENT WAS 
CONSISTENT WITH HISTORIC USE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the extent of any prescriptive easement is 
"measured and limited by its historic use during the prescriptive period." McBride v. 
McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978). The Utah Supreme Court has also held that 
"[T]he owner of the dominant estate may enjoy to the fullest extent the rights conferred 
by his easement [as long as he does not] alter its character so as to further burden or 
increase the restriction upon the servient estate." Id. The evidence clearly and 
convincingly demonstrated that the Lane during the prescriptive period was used for 
residential and agricultural purposes. These purposes for the Lane's use included 
accessing the rear portion of both the Witt and McNaughten properties. 
The evidence presented before the court indicated that during the prescriptive 
period, the Witts, McNaughtens, and the Lunts used the Lane for both residential and 
agricultural uses. The Plaintiffs witness testified both the Witts and the McNaughtens 
used the Lane to access their respective acreage, drive cattle, move farm equipment, as 
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well as using the Lane as a driveway. The trial court found this evidence to be clear and 
convincing. Reflecting the testimony of the parties, the trial court found that both parties 
"jointly used the Lane to access their acreage, run cattle, haul hay, move farm equipment, 
and park cars as often as either found it necessary and convenient." R. at 728. This 
finding by the trial court is supported by the testimony of witnesses for both sides. 
Mr. Carlisle stated that in the 1920's and 1930's the Witts used the Lane for 
vehicular traffic and parked their car on the Lane and later just south of the Lane when a 
garage was built. R. 958 at 127:20-25. He also testified that the Lane was used for 
driving cattle, and accessing the canal for swimming. R. 958 at 117-119. Evidence was 
presented by Ms. Boren that the Lane was used for a driveway during the late 1940's. R. 
958 at 64:7-17. Jack Lunt testified that at one point they took "a bob sleigh and wagons" 
and other haying equipment down the Lane. R. 958 at 30:10-13. Garth Lunt testified that 
the Lane or driveway had existed "forever, as far as I know" (R. 958 at 134:10-11), that 
they used the Lane to take cattle and teams of horses up it and hay back to the barn and 
machinery (R. 958 at 134-135), and that during the wintertime they would bring 
machinery from the north fields and park it on the Lane (R. 958 at 135). He later testified 
that from 1954 to the early 1990fs that he and the Witts used the Lane to haul hay to their 
respective barns, move equipment up and down the Lane, move horses and cattle up and 
down the Lane, and the county would use the Lane to access the property to spray thistles, 
clean the canal and remove snow. R. 958 at 138. 
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This case was brought before the trial court as Mr, I unt sought to continue U use 
the I,ane to access the rear portion of his acreage, that can only be accessed by traversing 
the I ,ane. I his use is consistent witl 1 till: le histoi ic 1 ise cit irii lg the prescripts e pei iod 
-" J: •^•lient and livestock were driven down the Lane 
to the back of the McNaughten/Lunt propert)' , Today vehicles are still driven to the back 
of the property. The type of vehicle used does not automatically lead to the conclusion 
has increased on the servient estate. 
The evidence presented is clear and convincing that the uses during the 
prescriptive period were both agrui.; :. .;.:.. r^iu-j::. 
main i ise of tl le easen lent vv as to - - - 4X portions olTh * : ^w r t y . The trial ^ouu s 
final order states "Plaintiff is entitled to use the easement as any party would normally use 
a driveway." R. at 843. This use is exactly what the Lane was used i..- wistoricalh uiit; 
iliiiiiif.: (In: pivsu'ipliw |VM<HI a dnwu.is n:w\l nt loi k-tli I^LIJI^ nllin\'il (Iarm afiitpinctit, 
cattle, etc.) and residential (vehicles, walking) use. These rights of use have not '"enlarged 
[or] place[d] a greater burden or servitude on the property" as alleged by the Lances. 
AtCtsuii >. ^ unJb'jrg. i . . . . . /v. 
cleili led ii i tl le ti ial coi irts fii lal order must be upheld. 
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IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DETERMINING THE WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY OF THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED. 
The correctness of the trial court's factual findings based on the witness testimony 
will only be reversed if they are found to be "clearly erroneous." 438 Main Street v. Easy 
Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,149 (Utah 2004). The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
"Evaluating conflicting testimony is the proper role of the finder of fact." Hogle v. 
Zinetics Med., Inc., 2002 UT 121, \ 16 (Utah 2002). "When an appellant asserts that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the lower court's findings of fact, 'we do not weigh the 
evidence de novo.' Rather, we accord great deference to the lower court's findings, 
'especially when they are based on an evaluation of conflicting live testimony.'" Id. 
(quoting In re Estate o/Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). "Moreover, 'to mount a 
successful challenge to the correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings even viewing it in light most 
favorable to the court below.'" Id. (quoting Alta Indus. Limited v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
1284 (Utah 1993). The Lances have failed to marshal all the evidence that supports the 
trial court's findings. The testimony of the witnesses established, and the trial court 
found, that the width of the Lane during the prescriptive period was 34-35 feet in width. 
This was the testimony of both Jack and Garth Lunt. R. 958 at 42, 135-136. There is no 
testimony to support the Lances assertion that the Lane was 10-12 feet in width. In 
-28-
addition to this testimony, the trial court was able to go to the property to inspect the Lane 
visually. R. 958 ai 12Q--1 ~r>. In its findings of fact, the trial court stated that "the Lane 
commences at 600 W est UIK; ... _w lea W U;„ /9. 
1
 .-.."- !•• . .• * ^-e\ base this argument 
on a statement made by Garth Lunt who said "there was about a 10 feet wire gate" (R. 
958 at 186). Appellant's Brief at 6. This gate, the same 10-12 foot gate uiai jack * .nt 
the Lane along 600 West. Rather, thi^ <jate ^ as part of the fence which ran alongside the 
Lane. The gate was at the end of the Lane where it turned and allowed access from the 
Lane to tiie i,uiii s rear acreage. ' _ loot gate was not set across .;. . a;;. . 
argument ihai the use ui the Lane could onl) be 10-12 feel in ,\idth due to this gate. 
While the issue of the final width of the I ,ane will be addressed in greater detai .. e^ 
cross-appeal, the I .ai ices' asser Lioi I tl lat tl le \ - idtl i of: It le I ai le si lould be lin lited to 10 12 
feet is unsupported after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
court. 
" I 'he challenge b> the Lances as to the size Oi me easement has not sho \ v i I tl I ;,: trial 
court's findings to be legally insufficient See Bogle, 2002 I J I at 1] 16. Especially, when 
those findings are viewed in the light most favorable to the court below. See Id. 
Therefore, this Court should deny the I,ance's appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, Appellee Garth Lunt requests 
this Court to deny the Lances appeal in its entirety, and together with all further relief the 
Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances. 
CROSS-APPEAL OF GARTH LUNT 
INTRODUCTION 
The issues of abandonment and the limitation of a prescriptive easement are before 
this Court on cross-appeal. The trial court ruled that the Lunts abandoned the 14 feet in 
the width of their prescriptive easement and abandoned the prescriptive easement west of 
the gate that ran across the Lane approximately 180 feet from the road. By so doing, Mr. 
Lunt's prescriptive easement and his ability to access the rear acreage of the property was 
severely limited. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred by ruling sua sponte on the issue of abandonment, an issue 
that was not before the court. Even if the trial court had the authority to rule on the issue 
of abandonment, it misapplied the doctrine of abandonment when it held as a matter of 
law that Mr. Lunt intentionally abandoned portions of the prescriptive easement. 
Mr. Lunt appeals the trial court's ruling on abandonment for two reasons. First, 
the trial court reached beyond the scope of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c)(1) by 
ruling on abandonment when it was not an issue raised or tried before the court. Second, 
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the Lances failed to prove abandonment by clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence. In 
addition, Mr. I iiiit also appeals the limitation of the width and length of the easement. 
1 1 le limitation of the width to 20 feet is ii ICOI isistent \ dtl 1 e\ idence presented at trial ai id 
llt'i" Ii iit! i oiirf s |Biii4ltii<_* of liu'l I'lial Ihe 1 nuc was 34 feet during the time the prescriptive 
easement was created. Ihe trial court also limited the length of the easement to 180 feet 
instead of the 235 feet that is supported by the record. 
MIL Ithil 'Hiiiiiiii Ii uiim I m 11
 h m n Mi 1 iiiiiii liui>a piLMTipln c easement I I I iln, 1 ,ine I in 
severely limited this easement with its sua sponte ruling on the issue of abandonment and 
the limitation on the width and length of the easement. Therefore. M" T mt -equests this 
Court to grant relief by reversing the trial court* s finding of abariu 
Iimil.ilion i>I* 111r caseniL/iil h iiv.loriii;' Ihe length and \\ itl( 11 oil l! ! ^a^'iptive casement 
in full. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR 
BY RULING SUA SPONTE ON THE ISSUE OF ABANDONMENT 
WHEN THIS ISSIIE WAS NOT RAISED OR TRIED BEFORE IT. 
The i • ami the trial court entered judgment on a theory that was not raised by 
the pleadings or tried before the court is a conclusion of law that is reviewed under the 
correction of error standard. See Cc nvley v. Pi rrfer, 2005 i \;pj:) 518, """t 31 (1 J I >. ' \pp, 2005). 
The !nu! vjini '/nrd !", imu\n\ic\ on ilir h^ic of abandonment because abandonment was 
neither raised nor tried before the court by either party. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(c)(1) as interpreted by Utah case law bars trial courts from granting rei^i on issues 
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that parties do not raise or try. Ut. R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1). While Rule 54(c)(1) permits 
courts to grant relief on grounds not pleaded, "that rule does not go so far as to authorize 
the granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried." Combe v. Warren's Family 
Drive-Inns Inc, 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984). It is error for a trial court to grant relief 
on issues not raised or tried before it. Combe, 680 P.2d at 736 (citing Curran v. Mount, 
657 P.2d 389 (Ala. 1980)). In reversing the Combe trial court's sua sponte ruling in that 
case, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "It is error to adjudicate issues not raised before or 
during trial and unsupported by the record." Id., citing Curran v. Mount, 657 P.2d 389 
(Ala. 1980). 
When trial courts make findings and determinations on matters outside of the 
issues of the case presented, it is not only clear error, but such findings "will have no 
force or effect." Id. (citing Brantley v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist, 587 P.2d 427 (N.M. 1978)). 
Moreover, "in law or in equity, a judgment must be responsive to the issues framed by the 
pleadings, and a trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented 
for determination. Any findings rendered outside the issues are a nullity." Id. (citing 
Estate ofHurlbutt, 585 P.2d 724 (Ore. 1978); Credit Investment and Loan Co. v. 
Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 444 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1968)). Parties have the power to 
choose the specific issues it raises before the court and a trial court cannot enter findings 
on those issues parties choose not to raise. Id. The Combe court further clarified, 
"[p]arties may limit the scope of litigation if they choose, and if an issue is clearly 
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withheld, the court cannot nevertheless adjudicate it and grant corresponding relief." Id. 
(citing Wineglass Ranches, Inc. v. Campell, 473 P.2d 496 (A, ^70)). 
iiiv. \ tLi, •_ oin* * f Appeals Cian;iCvi t w-.;;/Jc n\ iVK^i:. i:::; ... . : »: 
•' * '^ i i : :k ' i cut notice of issues through 
the pleadings. See Cowley v. Poncr, 2005 UT App 51 X (I :iaf u.Anp. 2005V The Court 
of Appeals distinguished the appeal in Porter, where Porter appealed that the trial L,:U; /s 
ruling was not based on claims raised in the coi i iplaint : i tri s :1 before the ecu irt, froi n 
Combe. The ( "ouil ol" /Appeals in Porter held that courts can rule on issues so long as the 
parties have sufficient notice of issues from the pleadings and are not adversely 
prejudiced by the court ruling on those issues. 1 lie Court stated: 
Rule 54(c)(1) requires trial courts to be liberal in awarding appropriate relief 
justified by the facts developed at trial, as long as the failure to request a particular 
form of relief does not prejudice a party in the preparation or trial of the case. If 
there is no prejudice, it is necessan ouh thai the relief granted be supported by the 
evidence and be a permissible form of relief lor the claims litigated. 
CiJ\vufs at r j , \ ^iirn^ J ic.-;,ierson v, ho* nln> < \t • ' II" ill In ' ll ' 1 * 'I. \pp l'>Ni I. In 
' ed that Porter not only had sufficient notice of the buyout 
contract issues in Cowley's initial complaint, but Porter's own memorandum in 
opposition to Cowley's motion for summary judgment addressed Hit: issue llul Ilk 
existence and terms of \hr buyout agreenirnl w nv rontrsled. and arguments related to 
whether a binding buyout agreement was reached were raised and litigated during the first 
phase of the trial. Id., at Iffl 40-41. 
Unlike Cowley, in this case the trial court's sua sponte abandonment ruling 
prejudiced Lunt because it was not raised or tried before the trial court and Lunt was 
unable to address the legal issues of abandonment, actual relinquishment of the Lane and 
the intent to abandon. No where in the pleadings do the Lances raise the issue of 
abandonment as a defense in their answer to the complaint or in answer to the amended 
complaint. However, both the complaint and amended complaint alleged boundary by 
acquiescence and prescriptive easement which were subsequently argued by both Parties 
at trial. 
During the actual trial phase of this case, the issue of abandonment was not raised 
or tried before the court. In fact, the only place where abandonment was even raised at 
the trial occurs at the last few pages of the trial transcript when the trial court briefly 
discussed the issue with Lances' counsel during his closing arguments. The Lances' 
counsel asserted that over time, because the Lunts used different access to their property 
contemporaneous to the Lane at issue, they had no prescriptive easement in the Lane. 
This prompted the court to ask counsel, "is it your position that the Lunts, if they did have 
a prescriptive easement, abandoned it in favor of that other use or other access?" R. 959 
at 357:21-23. Lances' counsel responded: 
I wish I had a case to quote to you because I haven't looked at that particular issue, 
but there is under Powell on real property a section, talks about abandonment, that 
you can't abandon the - you can abandon the use. If that's the case I think it's 
been abandoned, I think, for at least 20 years, because if we show '79 up to '99 it's 
been 20 years since it's been abandoned. I don't know the answer to that. Of 
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course, I could argue and say, "Well of course, Your Honor, of course it 's been 
abandoned.'* 
R. 959 at 358:2-9 (emphasis added). Lances ' counsel, however never raised the issue of 
abandoi in lei it befoi e 01 after this excl lai lge. I -ai ices failed to i aise abandonn lent as a 
defense to Lunt ' s claims for a boundary by acquiescence and prescriptive easement, and 
never sought to establish the theory of abandonment during the questioning of witnesses 
at trial. 
I lit: I .1 in: it > < < as preji idiced b;; ' not being able tc • de^ elop an argument and present 
evidence that the elements of abandonment had not been met. Testimony during trial was 
not sought on actual abandonment or intent to abandon, legal issues which have to be 
proven for a ;:numg of abai idol lment to be i i: lade. I ;\ Mil lern IC i : , "h In: , I i int v > as i inable to 
properl\ respi MM) in llii-i issue because this exchange occurred during closing arguments 
and the issue was not raised or tried prior to this exchange. The Lances were not • 
concerned with abandonment. Their belief maintained from opening argun .: 
soundii lg of it le closing bell • v as tl: lat I li I -\ n i t • :>c -\ il :i not pi odi ice clear and convincing 
evidence of a boundary by acquiescence or a prescriptive easement. ;-u-v R. 959 at 
358:14-21 Because abandonment was not raised or tried, the court erred in ruling sua 
sponte on the issue, 
i !-o limitation on the easement due to the trial courts ruling on abandonment is not 
"supported by the evidence [or] a permissible form of relief for the claims litigated" 
because abandonment was never raised or t nee; CLIOW ,IK I. ... . . . s 
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The trial court found in its conclusions of law that a prescriptive easement existed on the 
full length of the Lane. Judge Pullan wrote: 
In the instant case, from the 1930's and continuing through at least the mid-1970fs, 
the McNaughtens have continuously used the Lane to transport cattle, haul hay, 
move agricultural equipment, and park cars. During this time, each family relied 
on the Lane to access the rear of their respective acreage. The Court concludes 
that the Plaintiff proved these elements by clear and convincing evidence. 
R. 729. However, the court then found, without the legal question being raised or tried, 
that a portions of the length and width of the prescriptive easement was abandoned by 
Lunt. R. 727. By addressing this issue sua sponte, the trial court acted beyond the scope 
of Rule 54(c)(1). Therefore, Lunt respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's ruling on abandonment and restore the prescriptive easement in whole in 
accordance with the trial court's finding of law. 
II. IF THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN RULING ON 
ABANDONMENT, IT STILL ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF 
THE DOCTRINE OF ABANDONMENT TO THIS CASE. 
In the alternative, even if this Court finds that the trial court was justified to rule 
sua sponte on the issue of abandonment, the standard of proof for abandonment was not 
met and the doctrine of abandonment was misapplied to this case. The finding by the trial 
court is in error and contrary to law as the evidence does not support a finding of Mr. 
Lunt's intent to abandon the easement. In Utah, "it is well-recognized that an easement 
or right of way may be abandoned." Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 
181, 182 (Utah 1977). However, the party asserting abandonment has to meet a high 
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standard to prove abandonment. A mere preponderance of the evidence is insufficient to 
show actual intent to abandon one's right in a prescriptive easement. Western Gateway, 
567 P.2d at 182 (citing Harmon v. Rasmiissen, 375 P.2d 763,, 765 (I Jtah 1962) ("Pr< )()f of 
abandoi n :t lent of si id I an easement reqi lires action releasing o vvi lership tl: le right to i ise 
with clear and convincing proof of intentional abandonment .") . Instead, a party seeking 
to nullify another ' s easement or property interest on the ground- of abandonment must 
establish such abandonment by "clear, unequivocal , ..,;., j ^ v : - \ J O idem c. ' 'w/r i. 
Ryn/utrl. 200", I r| K-I «| I 1 (I i|,ili MIOS Mri f i i r / ht\n>mhv (hodvear Tire & Rubber, 199 
l ; .2d 43 i , H 5 5 (8th Cir. 1952)); see also Lucky Seven Rodeo (\>rj\ v cL<rk, ^55 P.2d "50 . 
753 (Utah Ct .App. 1988). This standard of p roof is at least a standard of proof as ingn as 
; \'\w- \dJinuiun v. Lexus, 441 U.S. 418, 432 {IV~9)). Therefore, a "'clear, unequivocal 
and decis ive" showing of abandonment can o n h be met where (lie "acts of the owner 
clearly show that such was his purpose. ' J utile v. Sowaclski. 1 lu V, M^9. 9 (o (I itah 
19712),,, 
In addition, the doctrine of abandonment is uniform in all states, including Man . in 
that non-use of a prescriptive easement alone, regardless of the length o f t he period o: 
non-use., is Ii lsufficiei it to pi o v e abandoi n nent See Western Gatewcn >, 567 P 2d at 182 
Rather, a prescriptive easement is only considered abandoned when the dominant estate 
holder demonstrates an actual intent to abandon, it. Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App. 278 
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Tf 16 fn 6 (Utah Ct.App. 1999). Therefore, the primary elements of abandonment are 
actual relinquishment and intent to abandon, or in other words, "the intention to abandon 
and the external act by which that intention is carried into effect." Botkin v. Kickapoo, 
Inc., 505 P.2d 749, 752 (Kan. 1973); see also Harmon v. Rasrnussen, 375 P.2d 762, 764-
66 (Utah 1962) (stating that overt act is needed to prove intent to abandon and proof of 
abandonment requires action releasing ownership and right to use with clear and 
convincing proof of intentional abandonment). While Utah case law does not explicitly 
state an "affirmative act" is needed, the requirement for an "overt act" is similar to some 
states' requirement that an affirmative act is needed to prove abandonment. See e.g. 
Sabados v. Kiraly, 393 A.2d 486 (Pa.Super. 1978) (Abandonment requires a showing that 
a party intended to abandon and give up permanently his right to use an easement. Such 
conduct must consist of some affirmative act which renders use of the easement 
impossible, or of some physical obstruction of it in a manner that is inconsistent with its 
further use.) 
In this case, the evidence failed to meet the strict standard of proof that there was 
both actual relinquishment of the easement and an intent to abandon the easement. As 
such, the trial court did not correctly apply the law of abandonment to this case. 
A. The Lane Was Never Actually Abandoned And Use of the Lane, 
Compatible With Its Historical Uses, Has Continued to the Present. 
The abandonment standard is met when clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence 
demonstrates the prescriptive easement was actually relinquished and abandoned. The 
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burden is on the person asserting abandonment to prove it. Provo River Water Users 
Ass'n v. Lambert, 642 P.2d 12 i 9, 1221 (Utah 1982). One way to prove actual 
relinquishment or abandonment of an easement is foi the party asserting abai ldonmei it to 
pi odi ice :leai i it le qi ii < /ocal, at id decisive evidei ice tl lat i ise of the easement has changed 
and its current use is for "an entirely different purpose which is incompatible with the 
original purpose for which the easement was created." Brown v. Oregon Short Line • R. 
] hr si:mii:ird for abandonment is also met where the evidence presented at trial is 
clear, unequivocal, and decisive that adverse use b\ the owner of the ser lent estate is 
acquiesced in b>r the owner ol ,n^ juniinant estate for a ^erfo; ^i ' l imc »• iik-^ 
e LaO.: • ; ' . ' " : \. '^ . . . : ;\ -/ y. PiuOW, 
541 S.L. 2d 550, 560 ^Vd. 2uulj. 
In Brown. clear, uikv .^ ocau and decisive evidence demonstrated that an 
easemen, i^: (lie purposes of ingress/egress to a i esidential i I : igl lborhood w as actually 
aband • •• l ^ n iilnuT produced at trial was clear, unequivocal, and decisive that the 
residences formerly the reason for the ingress/egress were torn down and the land was 
used to construct and operate a permanent railroad, switch, spur and oilier tracks. 
Therefore it v -as impossible 1 o \ ise tl le easemei it foi its original pi irpose of ingress/egress 
to residences. Id. Because the new use was incompatible with the original easement, 
there was actual abandonment of the easement. 
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Hudson v. Pillow is an example of a servient estate retaking a prescriptive 
easement by open, notorious, and adverse use for twenty years. In Hudson, the party 
asserting abandonment was able to produce evidence that while another party held a 
prescriptive easement, the servient estate holder placed gates over the road and only 
allowed individuals to use the road with their permission. The servient estate granted this 
required permission for use for more than twenty years. Therefore, the court was justified 
in finding that non-use of the easement coupled with the open, notorious, and adverse acts 
of the servient owners for a period sufficient to create a prescriptive right, was clear, 
unequivocal, and decisive proof of actual relinquishment and abandonment. 
In this case, there was no actual relinquishment or abandonment of the easement. 
While the findings of fact indicate that agricultural use of the rear portion of the Lane 
west of the gate has dwindled and there is currently a gate across the Lane, these facts do 
not prove actual relinquishment of the Lane west of the gate. Unlike Brown, the use of 
the Lane has not changed such that it is incompatible with its original use. In fact, the 
Lane west of the gate is accessible for use completely compatible with its original 
purpose, which the evidence presented at trial, includes using the Lane for "access [to] 
the rear of their respective acreage." R. 728. 
In addition, the record does not support a Hudson-like retaking of the easement by 
open, notorious and adverse use by the servient estate (the Whitts/Lances). In fact, the 
record demonstrates otherwise, that neither the servient or dominant estate holders asked 
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permission of each other to use the Lane. The testimony at trial reflects that the Witts and 
the McNaughtens used the Lane to accesss their acreage, move farm equipment and 
livestock, and to park cars. .vc e.g. K. ^ f.v . 
inlliiiy 'i»l iihaiulniinicni Ihciv is no disnission ofactual abandonment by either change of 
use incompatible with the historical use or adverse possession by the servient estate. 
While the trial court's abandonment ruling does state that a gate blocking the Lane was 
const:,; .... 
w hat p i u pose the gate was installed, whether the servient estate was asserting a right or 
simply placing a gate over the Lane, and whether the gate restricted Mr. I lint's access. 
Furthermore, the record does demonstrate that permission wa ;:rai.;v s 
dominant cstalc Inns" ll / I" aav \s •- - • -o;.-. :< '. K. 752 ffl[ 52-53. I his 
supports the conclusion that the ability to use the Lane w as never relinquished or 
abandoned. Accordingly, there was no actual abandonment of the I,ane west o; UIL gale. 
The Clear, Unequivocal, and Decisive Stand. i ml \y sis Not Met Itemiise 
Iiiint Did Not Intend to Abandon the Lane. 
It is difficult to establish clear, unequivocal, and decisive proof of intent to 
abandon. In Utah, an overt act proving intent to abandon, coupled with non-use or actual 
abandonment ia icqum il (o pruu1 abandonment h* i llrai iiiir-i|iiis i i al unci ilaashe 
evidence. See Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 764 {Liuii 19o2;. iio\\e\er, ""ihe 
holder of an easement does not forfeit a pari of it because he V:s no present need for it ~~ 
because he is unlikely to exercise the whole of /<//- : :r ru ..•/;. . \ 
A.2d 862, 864 (N.H. 1985). It is well-established previously that non-use alone is 
insufficient to prove abandonment. Even extended non-use "is not of itself an 
abandonment of it, but, at most, in connection with other facts, may be evidence of an 
intention to abandon or of actual abandonment. Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 102 
P. 740, 742 (Utah 1909) (emphasis added). 
Utah courts have determined that non-use of an easement coupled with a fence 
across it and the way covered with undergrowth and debris is insufficient to prove intent 
to abandon. Western Gateway Storage v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977). 
Filling dirt around a headgate to prevent its use, coupled with several years of actual non-
use of the easement to move water is also insufficient to prove intent to abandon. 
Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 765 (Utah 1962). 
In other states, courts have found that evidence of non-use coupled with an 
easement holder allowing a fence to block access to portions of an easement or acquiesce 
in the easement being overgrown with small and large trees, thus blocking use of the 
Lane, is insufficient to demonstrate an actual intent to abandon. See Chickamanga 
Properties, Inc. v. Barnard, 853 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. 2006); Strahin v. Lantz, 456 S.E.2d 12 
(W.Va. 1995); Downing House Realty v. Hampe, 497 A.2d 862 (N.H. 1985). 
The record fails to support any evidence that Mr. Lunt actually intended to 
abandon his easement. Furthermore, the Lances failed to raise the issue of intent to 
abandon, therefore making it impossible to prove intent to abandon by clear, unequivocal, 
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and decisive evidence. While the record indicates there may have been periods of non-
use on Mr. Lunt's easement west of the gate of the prescriptive easement, the record fails 
provide any overt act in connection with non-use that could be considered evidence of an 
intention to abandon the prescriptive easement. See Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 
764 (Utah 1962). As previously discussed, the record shows that the issue of 
abandonment was not raised at all during trial. Opposing counsel did not ask any of the 
witnesses questions regarding non-use, who put the gate across the Lane, whether any 
parties contested the gate installation, or whether the Lane was used after the gate was 
placed across the Lane. Lance also failed to explore this issue during pre-trial 
proceedings. 
C. The Trial Court's Finding of Abandonment is Clear Error Because An 
Implied Intent to Abandon Does Not Meet the Clear, Unequivocal, and 
Decisive Standard Necessary to Prove Abandonment. 
Implication of intent to abandon is not clear, unequivocal, or decisive proof of 
abandonment or intent thereof. While the statement in the court's ruling originating in 25 
Am. Jur. 2d § 112 stating "an easement is considered abandoned when there is a history 
of non-use coupled with an act or omission showing clear intent to abandon" is well-
founded, it is not dispositive that mere implied acquiescence in a gate being placed across 
a Lane is clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence of an intent to abandon. See R. 726.3 
3
 "In the instant case, the gate blocking the Lane was constructed in the early 
1980?s. From that date, Plaintiff ceased to use the Lane west of the gate. For more than 20 
years, Plaintiff has acquiesced in the closure, never taking any action to object. This 
history of non-use and inaction show a clear intent on the part of Plaintiff to abandon the 
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Neither Utah law nor cases from other jurisdictions support the conclusion that 
mere acquiescence in placing a "gate" across a Lane coupled with non-use is sufficient to 
prove intent to abandon. See Western Gateway Storage v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 
(Utah 1977); see also Chickamanga Properties, Inc. v. Barnard, 853 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. 
2006); Strahin v. Lantz, 456 S.E.2d 12 (W.Va. 1995); Downing House Realty v. Hampe, 
497 A.2d 862 (N.H. 1985). Instead, the law requires that there must be some factual 
finding that demonstrates Lunt acquiesced because he intended to abandon the Lane. 
While the findings of fact only indicate that the gate was constructed across the Lane in 
the early 1980's and was moved forward at one period of time. There is no testimony or 
factual findings informing who installed the gate, why access to the Lane west of the gate 
was discontinued, whether Lunt intended to give up use of the Lane, or whether he simply 
currently had no present need to use the gate. 
To the contrary, a gate across the Lane did not give Mr. Lunt any indication that he 
could not use the Lane if he so desired. The evidence clearly and convincingly supported 
the trial court's conclusion of law that "neither the Witts nor the McNaughtens ever asked 
permission of the other to use the Lane." Instead, both parties used the Lane for 
agricultural and residential purposes as often as they found convenient. There is no 
evidence in the record that the gate was intended to block Mr. Lunt's use of the Lane west 
Lane west of the gate. 
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of the gate. He could have used the rear portion of Lane west of the gate at any time if he 
so desired. 
This is similar to a previously referenced case from New Hampshire, in which a 
fence was erected over a portion of an easement and remained in place for approximately 
thirty years. In addition to extended non-use of the easement and the fence across the 
easement, large trees also grew over the easement. Despite this, the court found the 
evidence insufficient to establish abandonment because of the lack of permanency of the 
non-use. The court held "had the owner of the easement chosen to exercise control of the 
land, the fence and trees could easily have been removed at any time." Downing House 
Realty v. Hampe, 497 A.2d 862, 864 (N.H. 1985). Likewise, had Mr. Lunt chosen to 
exercise control over his easement, the Lane was still accessible for use as it had been in 
the past. 
However, neither the issue of abandonment nor the issue of whether Lunt 
acquiesced in the closure were explored by either party during the trial - thus there was 
no notice that this was an issue before the court. The issue of abandonment was raised 
only by the court during closing arguments for the defense. The question of whether the 
Lunts acted to oppose the gate, or even if the gate prevented them from accessing the 
western portion of the Lane was not even discussed by the parties at any time during these 
proceedings. Therefore, there can be no "clear, unequivocal, and decisive showing" of 
intent to abandon. State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84 ]f 14 (Utah 2005). 
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Similar to cases from Utah and many other jurisdictions, the record in this case 
fails to support a finding that the evidence before the trial court of both actual 
relinquishment and intent to abandon was clear, unequivocal and decisive. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY LIMITING THE EASEMENT TO 
20 FEET IN WIDTH AND 183 FEET IN LENGTH. 
The trial court erred in limiting Mr. Lunt's prescriptive easement to 20 feet in 
width and 183 feet in length when its findings of facts expressly stated the Lane was 34 
feet in width and its conclusions of law found the prescriptive easement was for the entire 
length of the Lane. The measure and limit of this prescriptive easement is determined by 
the use made of the Lane during the prescriptive period from the late 1920's to the 
present. See McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978) ( "It has long been the 
law of this jurisdiction, and elsewhere that the extent of an easement acquired by 
prescription is measured and limited by the use made during the prescriptive period."); 
see also Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates HO A, 2004 UT App. 149, ^ 14 (Utah Ct.App. 
2004) (the court looked to prior use of easement to determine current scope.) In addition, 
courts are forbidden from limiting an easement based on equity and must strictly enforce 
the well-established law that the measure and limit of an easement is the use made of it 
during the prescriptive period. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
In this case, the trial court held that the Lane during the prescriptive period was 34 feet in 
width and extended to the end of the Lane. R. 728. However, witness testimony stated 
that the length of the easement was between 235-247 feet in length. See R. 735, 737. 
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Therefore, the court's order limiting the scope of the easement to 20 feet in width and 180 
feet in length must be overturned and returned to 34 feet in width and no less that 235 feet 
in length. 
The trial court found that an easement was created in the Lane, that the Lane was 
34 feet in width, and its use extended from the road to the back of the properties, which 
several witnesses testified was at least 235 feet in length. This, therefore, is the measure 
and limit of the easement. Other than abandonment, the only explanation for the trial 
court's limitation on the width and length of the Lane is that the limitation is based in 
equity. Utah courts have held that a trial court cannot limit a prescriptive easement based 
on equity. Id. 
The trial court in this case limited the historical use of Lunt's prescriptive 
easement to 20 feet in width and 183 feet in length based on equity. In finding that Mr. 
Lunt has a prescriptive easement over the Lances property, the court indicated the 
measure and limit of the use of the easement. "From the 1930's and continuing through at 
least the mid-1970s, the McNaughtens have continuously used the Lane to transport 
cattle, haul hay, move agricultural equipment, and park cars. During this time, each 
family relied on the Lane to access the rear of their respective acreage." R. 729. The 
court concludes that the Plaintiff proved these elements by clear and convincing 
evidence." Id. This language makes clear that the Lane, all 34 feet in width, and 
extending from the road to the rear portions of the property, was acquired by prescriptive 
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easement. Therefore, the trial court erred when it limited the scope of the easement to 20 
feet in width extending only to the gate across the easement. 
In a post-trial hearing to address concerns arising out of preparing the order, 
Lunt's counsel raised the issue of the limitation of the easement in preparing the order. 
He stated to the trial court that the width of the easement was not disputed at trial, nor 
was abandonment of the width of the Lane discussed at trial, and therefore the origin of 
the 20 foot limitation of the easement was unclear. See R. 960 at 3-4. The trial court 
responded: 
It was my intent when I issued that decision that the width of the easement was at 
one period of time the broader width, but that it had been abandoned, and what 
was - what remained was a 20-foot width for the purposes of a driveway is 
essentially what they had used it for in the mid '80's. 
Id. at 3. This is inconsistent with comments later in the hearing and findings of fact in the 
ruling. At the hearing, the court stated that "driveways are used for a host of reasons" 
including livestock and utility easements. Id. at 8:12-16. In addition, the trial court's 
findings of fact in the ruling indicate that the width of the Lane was never in dispute, only 
the length thereof: 
Between these two properties is the Lane which gives rise to this dispute. The land 
commences at 600 West and is 34 feet wide. The Lane runs west between the 
properties. The length of the Lane is in dispute. 
R. 739. 
The trial court found that Mr. Lunt holds a prescriptive easement, 34 feet in width 
and extending from the road to the rear of the property, approximately 235-247 feet. The 
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trial court erred when it limited the easement created during the prescriptive period as 
described by McBride. Therefore, Lunt requests that the scope of the easement be 
returned to its original form, which is 34 feet in width and not less that 235 feet in length. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, Cross-Appellant Garth Lunt 
requests this Court to reverse the judgment of the court below in regards to the issue of 
abandonment and to issue an order finding the easement to be at least 235 feet in length 
by 34 feet in width as supported by the record, and together with all further relief the 
Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances. 
Dated this \ ^ day of July, 2007. 
BOSTWICK & PRICE P.C. 
Randy*}. Birch 
Corey S. Zachman 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEFS OF 
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT MR. GARTH LUNT to be sent by United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, on this ' O day of July, 2007, as follows: 
Kraig J. Powell, Esq. 
Shawn W. Potter, Esq. 
TESCH LAW OFFICES PC 
314 Main Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060 
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Ruling 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT <JM> 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARTH LUNT, trustee of the GARTH 0. 
LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HAROLD LANCE and DIANE LANCE, and 
Does 1-10, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 020500612 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter came before the Court for bench trial on November 1-2, 2005. The Plaintiff 
was represented by attorneys Mr. Randy B. Birch and Mr. Jason Hadley. The Defendants were 
represented by attorney Mr. Chris D. Greenwood. 
The parties claim conflicting interests in a lane between their adjoining properties. 
Plaintiff asserts claims for boundary by acquiescence and prescriptive easement. After careful 
consideration of the testimony and evidence presented, the Court now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
General Description of 
The Adjoining Parcels and The Disputed Lane 
1. Plaintiff owns property located at 205 North 600 West. The parcel is located on the west 
side of 600 West. The home on the lot faces 600 West. 
2. Plaintiff is the successor in interest to Lincoln McNaughten (uMr. McNaughten"), and his 
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family. Mr. McNaughten was the step-father of Jack Lunt, Moneves Boren, and Garth 
Lunt (trustee of the Plaintiff Trust). 
3. Defendants own the parcel of property immediately south of the Plaintiffs property. 
They acquired it in August 1991. 
4. Defendants are successors in interest to the Frank Witt and his family. 
5. Between these two properties is the lane which gives rise to this dispute. The lane 
commences at 600 West and is 34 feet wide. The lane runs west between the properties. 
The length of the lane is in dispute. 
6. Running along the south side of the lane is a wooden fence ("the wooden fence"), which 
has been overgrown by trees. Commencing at 600 West, the wooden fence runs west for 
approximately 175 feet where it terminates at a gate ("the gate") crossing the lane. 
Backing to the wooden fence are outbuildings located on the Witt property. 
7. Commencing near 600 West and running west, the north side of the lane is bordered by 
(1) the south wall of the home on Plaintiffs property; (2) a large willow tree; and (3) a 
fence (the old Witt fence) which runs for a substantial distance through open fields to a 
canal. The old Witt Fence commences at the north end of the gate which crosses the lane. 
8. The lane appears on aerial photographs in 1946, 1962, 1978, 1979, 1985, 1993, 1997, and 
2001. 
Use and Condition of the Lane 
Latel920's 
9. Eldon Carlisle was born in 1917 and is 88 years old. Except for his military service 
which occurred between 1941 and 1946, he has lived in Heber City his entire life. 
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10. In the late 1920's, Mr. Carlisle recalls the Witts owning an automobile. The Witts parked 
the car in a garage which backed against the south side of the lane. The garage was 
accessed by way of the lane. 
1930 through 1950 
11. Mr. Carlisle was a childhood friend of Mr. McNaughten. As a boy in the 1930's he 
helped the McNaugtens run cows down the lane. 
12. At that time, the lane continued beyond the gate which exists today. At the far west end 
of the lane, there was a gate in the old Witt fence ("the far west gate"). Through the far 
west gate, the McNaughtens would access their pasture and barn to the north. 
13. At that time, the old Witt fence ran east along the north side of the lane all the way to 600 
West. 
14. After returning from his military service in 1946, Mr. Carlisle observed the McNaughtens 
run cows down the lane just as they had done before. Mr. Carlisle recalls seeing the 
McNaughtens using the lane in this way in the 1950fs. 
15. Mr. Carlisle testified that neither the Witts nor the McNaughtens ever objected to use of 
the lane by the other. 
16. Mr. Duane C. Smith is 73 years old and has lived in Heber City his entire life. As early 
as 1938, when he was 8 years of age, Mr. Smith drove cattle for the McNaughtens. Mr. 
Smith never took the McNaughtens' cows down the lane. 
17. From 1930 and continuing into the 1940's, Mr. Smith saw stackers, bull-rakes, and other 
farm equipment belonging to the Witts stored on the lane. At this time, the lane was 
fenced on both sides. On the south side of the lane, the wooden fence ran 150 to 200 feet 
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where it terminated at the Witt's barn. On the north side of the lane, the old Witt Fence 
ran all the way to 600 West. 
18. Between 1945 and 1950, Mr. Smith worked for the McNaugtens harvesting hay and 
driving cows. During this time, he was at the McNaughten property at least two times per 
day and only observed the Witts using the lane. He drove the McNaughten cattle through 
a wire gate stretched between two willow trees approximately 150 feet north of the lane. 
He did not use the lane to drive the cattle onto the McNaughten property. 
19. Between 1945 and 1947, Mr. McNaughten constructed a "basement home" on his 
property. The lane ran east and west along the south wall of this house. The old Witt 
fence was partially removed to accommodate the home. The old Witt fence ran almost to 
the southwest corner of the home. There a small gate was maintained. It was only wide 
enough for a person to walk through. It permitted access to the McNaughten property 
from the lane. 
20. Between 1948 and 1949, Ms. Boren moved in with her mother and her father, Mr. 
McNaughten. During this time she helped with the McNaughtens' milk cows. She 
observed both the Witts and the McNaughtens park cars in the lane. Both families used 
the lane to transport hay and to move dairy cows to their respective barns. 
21. Ms. Boren testified that the lane continued west beyond the gate that exists today. At the 
end of the lane, the McNaughtens used the far west gate in the old Witt fence to access 
the McNaughten barn. Ms. Boren testified that from 600 West to the terminus of the 
lane, was 235 feet. 
22. Between 1945 and 1950, Ms. Frankie Witt Housel lived with her grandparents, Frank and 
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Maud Witt on the Witt property. 
23. She testified that the purpose of the wooden fence was to enclose the Witt home. 
According to Ms. Housel, the wooden fence commenced at 600 West and ran west to the 
corner of the first outbuilding (a tool shed) where it terminated. 
24. According to Ms. Housel, her grandfather was "definite about protecting the lane." She 
never saw the McNaughtens run cows, wagons, or farm equipment on the lane. She 
walked the old Witt fence regularly on her way to go swimming in the canal. Ms. Housel 
testified that there was no far west gate in the old Witt fence permitting access to the 
McNaughten barn. 
25. The 1946 aerial photograph clearly shows the lane running west from 600 West for some 
distance. Thereafter, it is obscured by trees. 
1950 through 1965 
26. From 1950 to 1955, Ms. Boren (who had moved to Wallsburg) continued to assist her 
parents milking and driving the cows and harvesting hay. During this time, she observed 
both the Witts and the McNaughtens park cars in the lane. Both families used the lane to 
transport hay to the barn and to move cows as described above. According to Ms. Boren, 
the lane was the only available access to the McNaughten barn. 
27. Ms. Boren never observed Mr. McNaughten or Mr. Witt argue about or ask permission of 
each other to use the lane. 
28. From 1950 to 1957, Ms. Housel continued to reside with her grandparents, the Witts. She 
never observed the McNaughtens use the lane for any purpose and maintains that her 
Grandfather did not approve of their doing so. 
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29. For some period of time between 1951 and the early 1960's, Jack Lunt lived at the 
McNaughten house. He ran cattle and helped cut and haul hay. During this period of 
time, he and others drove cows over the lane, as well as wagons, a bobsleigh, and farm 
machinery. 
30. According to Jack Lunt, neither the McNaughtens nor the Witts ever asked permission of 
the other to use the lane, they "just used it." 
31. Jack Lunt testified that during this time the lane continued west past the gate that exists 
today. It was fenced on both sides. The lane terminated some 62 feet west of the gate at 
the Witt barn. At the terminus, the McNaughtens would turn their cows to the north 
through the far west gate to access the McNaughten pasture and barn. The McNaughtens 
never used any land west of the Witt Barn. 
32. Jack Lunt testified that the total length of the common lane from 600 West to its terminus 
was 247 feet. 
33. After being released from military service in 1954, Garth Lunt joined his brother at the 
McNaugten home. Between 1954 and 1957, he helped haul hay and run cattle from the 
north fields. He too observed the lane being used by both the McNaugtens and Witts to 
haul hay, store equipment, and run cattle. 
34. Garth Lunt testified that the lane continued west beyond the gate that exists today. The 
lane terminated at the Witt Barn, where the far west gate was used to access the 
McNaughten pasture and barn. From 600 West to the terminus of the lane was 247 feet. 
35. Garth Lunt testified that both the McNaughten barn and the Witt barn were constructed 
after 1946. 
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36. Garth Lunt testified that the McNaughtens maintained the lane by periodically filling 
holes with gravel. He did not say when or how often this maintenance occurred. 
37. Garth Lunt testified that occasionally county employees used the lane to access areas 
where thistles needed to be sprayed. 
38. According to Garth Lunt, the McNaughtens and the Witts never asked permission of each 
other to use the lane. Rather, the families considered the lane mutual property. Likewise, 
the Plaintiff has never asked permission of any successor in interest to the Witts 
(including the Lances) to use the lane. 
39. In 1957, Garth Lunt moved to California and has resided there ever since. 
40. In the early 1960fs, the McNaughtens sold their grazing permit to Ott Sweat. At this time, 
the McNaughten's range cattle enterprise ceased, but the dairy operation continued. After 
the permit was sold, Jack Lunt obtained employment as a coal miner. Thereafter, he 
returned to the property periodically; however, his visits were sporadic. 
41. A photograph taken some time between 1962 and 1965 was received into evidence. It 
shows Mr. McNaughten's 1962 pickup parked in the lane adjacent to his home. 
42. The 1962 aerial photograph clearly shows the lane running west from 600 West past the 
McNaughten residence for some distance. The lane is then obscured by trees, but 
reappears and continues past the Witt Barn. The McNaughten barn is also visible. Mr. 
Maurice Pia, the Defendant's expert photogrammetrist, could not ascertain with certainty 
the existence of any other access to the McNaughten barn. 
1965 through 1985 
43. The evidence as to use of the lane during this period of time is limited. 
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44. According to Ms. Boren, the McNaughtens continued to have cows and other animals on 
their property and used the lane for these purposes. However, the scope of these activities 
appears to have been in decline. 
45. Jack and Garth Lunt occasionally visited the property during this period, but have limited 
knowledge of the use of the lane. 
46. In 1980, Mr. McNaughten died. Some animals were maintained on the property after his 
death, but Ms. McNaughten's health was failing. Ms. Boren moved into the family home 
to care for her mother who died in 1984. 
47. The 1978 and 1979 aerial photographs show the lane. However, some vegetation is 
growing on the south side of the McNaughten home. The Witt barn is gone. In the 1979 
photograph, some kind of shrubbery and vegetation appear on the south wall of the 
McNaugten home. 
48. The 1979 aerial photograph shows a large access road to the McNaughten property. Mr. 
Pia testified that the photograph depicted regular use of this road. The road commences 
at a point approximately 150 feet north of the lane. It runs west from 600 West, then cuts 
southwest to the McNaughten barn. 
49. The 1985 aerial photograph depicts this same access to the McNaughten barn and 
vehicles parked past the barn. The lane is visible. It runs west from 600 West for a 
distance only to again be obscured by trees. Vegetation is visible on the south side of the 
McNaughten house. Shrubbery and vegetation on the south side of the McNaughten 
home persist. 
8 
1985 to Present 
50. In the early 1980's, the gate was constructed across the lane. 
51. Sometime between 1986 and 1988, the Plaintiff began leasing the McNaughten home and 
an accessory apartment to tenants. From that time until the present, tenants leasing the 
property have used the lane to access the back apartment. 
52. One of these tenants was Robert Williams. Ms. Boren testified that Mr. Williams used 
the common lane to move his horses. 
53. Sometime after 1984, Ms. Boren gave permission to her grandson Trent Boren to use the 
lane to access the back pasture land. Other tenants of the property were not given 
permission to do so. 
54. In 1991, the McNaughten barn was sold and removed from the premises. 
55. The Defendants purchased the Witt parcel in 1991. 
56. In 1996, the Lances first informed Garth Lunt that they believed they were the owners of 
the common lane. 
57. In 1999, Ms. Boren obtained a survey from Lord Engineering, and the Defendants 
obtained a survey from Thompson-Hysell Engineers. The surveys conflict as to the 
boundary line between the two properties. 
58. Sometime in the late 1990's, the Defendants deposited large piles of fill dirt on the lane, 
partially blocking it. About the same time, Ms. Boren permitted her son to deposit large 
landscaping rocks on part of the lane. 
59. Early in 2001, the Lances notified the Plaintiff that vehicles were not to be parked on the 
lane. 
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60. In the 1993 aerial photograph, the lane is markedly less visible. Vegetation can be seen 
on the south side of the McNaughten home. What can be seen of the lane runs from 600 
West to the rear of the home. The lane is then obscured by trees and does not reappear 
west of those trees. The large access road to the north of the McNaughten home is readily 
apparent. 
61. The 1997 and 2001 aerial photographs are generally consistent with the 1993 photograph. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Boundary by Acquiescence 
To prove boundary by acquiescence, Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence four elements: "(1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or 
buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as the boundary, (3) for a long period of time, and 
(4) by adjoining property owners." RHN Corp. v. VeibelL 2004 UT 60, f22 (2004), quoting, 
Jacobs v. Hafem 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996). 
Plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "occupation" of the lane 
up to a visible line. From the 1930's through 1945, the old Witt fence marked the northern 
boundary of lane from 600 West to the far west gate. A part of the old Witt fence was removed 
to accommodate construction of the McNaughten home in 1945, but that fence together with the 
south wall of that home continued to mark the northern boundary of the lane until the late 1970's. 
The southern boundary of the lane has been marked by the wood fence, and various outbuildings 
on the Witt property from the 1930's to the present. From the 1930's through 1960, the wooden 
fence continued beyond the gate to the McNaughten barn, further extending the southern 
boundary of the lane. 
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Beginning in the 1930's and continuing through at least the mid 1970's, both the 
McNaughtens and the Witts used the lane to access their respective barns. However, this joint 
use does not amount to "occupation" by either party for purposes of boundary by acquiescence. 
Under that doctrine, "property rights are determined by actual possession of land." Gillmor v. 
Cummings. 904 P.2d 703, 707 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), citing, Carter v. Hanrath. 885 P.2d 801, 804 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, neither the McNaughten nor the Witt family possessed the 
lane to the exclusion of the other. Rather, both families desired that the lane be unobstructed so 
that it could be jointly used for agricultural purposes. On these facts, the Court cannot conclude 
by a preponderance of the evidence that either family occupied the lane up to a visible line. 
Plaintiff has also failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties 
mutually acquiesced in a particular line separating the properties. "To acquiesce means to 
'recognize and treat an observable line, such as a fence, as the boundary dividing the owner's 
property from the adjacent landowner's property." RHN Corp., 2004 UT 60, [^24, 96 P.3d 935, 
citing Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, |18, 44 P.3d 781. "Acquiescence, or recognition, may be 
tacit and inferred evidence." Ault, 2004 UT 60, ^[18. Acquiescence may be shown by 
"occupation up to, but never over" a visible line, as well as by silence or the failure of a party to 
object to a line as a boundary." RHN Corp.. 2004 UT 60, |25. 
In the instant case, the Witts never acquiesced in the wood fence as the northern boundary 
of their property. Likewise, the McNaughtens never acquiesced in the old Witt fence as the 
southern boundary of their property. Rather, both families occupied the lane over these 
purported boundary lines. Both families routinely used the entire lane between the fences for 
agricultural purposes, as if the lane belonged to them. Neither family recognized either fence as 
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a boundary between their respective properties. 
For these reasons, Plaintiffs claim for boundary by acquiescence fails. 
Prescriptive Easement 
"A prescriptive easement is created when the party claiming the prescriptive easement 
can prove that 'use of another's land was open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for 
a period of twenty years.'" Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1998), quoting, Valcarce 
v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998). These elements must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), citing, 
Garmond v. Kinney, 91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178 (1978). Whether an easement exists is a 
question of law. Orton, 920 P.2d at 1256. However, "such a finding is the type of highly fact-
dependent question, with numerous potential fact patterns, which accords the trial judge broad 
discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the given set of facts." Id. 
In the instant case, from the 1930's and continuing through at least the mid-1970's, the 
McNaughtens have continuously used the lane to transport cattle, haul hay, move agricultural 
equipment, and park cars. During this time, each family relied on the lane to access the rear of 
their respective acreage. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff proved these elements by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
The Defendants contend that use of the lane by the McNaughtens was by permission, and 
therefore not adverse to Witts' interests. Ms. Housel testified that her Grandfather Witt was 
"particular about protecting the lane." However, the weight of the evidence demonstrates clearly 
and convincingly otherwise. Multiple witnesses testified that neither the Witts nor the 
McNaughtens ever asked permission of the other to use the lane. Rather, the respective families 
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jointly used the lane to access their acreage, run cattle, haul hay, move farm equipment, and park 
cars as often as either found it necessary and convenient. In so finding, the Court notes that the 
testimony of Mr. Eldon Carlisle concerning use of the lane from the 1930's through the 1950's 
was particularly credible. 
The facts of this case are strikingly similar to those presented in Richins v. Struhs, 17 
Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314 (1966). In that case, the parties owned adjoining properties on 
Emigration Creek. The creek separated both properties from the road. In 1918, their 
predecessors in interest "jointly constructed [a] bridge and roadway and so maintained and used 
it so long as they owned the properties (until the 1950's)." Id., 412 P.2d at 315. The bridge and 
driveway were constructed "between the two properties on what was assumed to be the 
boundary." Id., 412 P.2d at 316. In 1960, the Struhs purchased one of the properties. After 
obtaining a survey, they "erected a fence in the driveway on what they assert [was] the true 
boundary." Id. That fence blocked the driveway, and the adjoining property owner's access. 
The trial court held that because the predecessors in interest had "used the driveway 
harmoniously and without conflict... the use was permissive and . . . therefore no prescriptive 
right to use the driveway arose." Id. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial 
court's conclusion did not "give effect to fundamental principles applicable to prescriptive 
rights." Id. The Court explained: 
In order for the use to have been permissive it would have to 
appear that the parties understood that the driveway was upon the 
Whipple's (defendant's predecessors) property; that it was with 
this understanding that they gave their consent to its use; and 
similarly that the Joneses (plaintiffs' predecessors) so understood 
and accepted and used it. No such view of the facts is warranted 
by the evidence... . [I]t is our opinion that the reasonable 
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conclusion to be drawn from the facts here shown, where the 
parties (predecessors) jointly established and used a driveway on 
what they thought their common boundary, is that the use meets 
the requirement of being open, notorious, continuous, and adverse 
for more than 20 years and therefore has established a prescriptive 
right to continue to so use it. 
LI, 412 P.2d at 316-17. See, Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 121 (Utah Ct App. 1994) 
(explaining that use of the common driveway in Struhs was always adverse because "defendant's 
predecessor did not know that the bridge was on his property [and] . . . could not have granted 
permission"). 
Here, there is no evidence that the Witts understood that the lane was on their property. 
The first efforts to ascertain the true boundary line were not pursued until 1999 when the Plaintiff 
and Defendants each obtained conflicting surveys. Like the adjoining property owners in Struhs, 
the Witts and McNaughtens established and harmoniously used a common lane from the 1930fs 
through at least the mid-1970's. That use is as a matter of law open, notorious, continuous and 
adverse for more than 20 years and establishes a prescriptive right in favor of Plaintiff. 
Abandonment 
"It is well-recognized that an easement or right of way may be abandoned." Western 
Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977). "Proof of abandonment of 
such an easement requires action releasing the ownership and the right to use with clear and 
convincing proof of an intentional abandonment." Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 765 
(Utah 1962). 
In determining the issue of abandonment, courts should consider "whether or not the right 
was acquired by prescription or grant, the extent of its use, and the actual intent of the owner." 
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Western Gateway Storage, 567 P.2d at 182. As to the issue of intent, abandonment requires the 
owner to "cease[] to use the easement... with the intention to make no further use of it." 
Harmon, 375 P.2d at 765. "An easement is considered abandoned when there is a history of non-
use coupled with an act or omission showing clear intent to abandon." Easements & Licenses In 
Real Property, 25 Am. Jur. 2d § 112. Adverse use by the owner of the servient estate, acquiesced 
in by the owner of the dominant estate, may constitute abandonment. Hudson v. Pillow, 261 Va. 
296, 541 S.E. 2d. 556 (2001). 
In the instant case, the gate blocking the lane was constructed in the early 1980?s. From 
that date, Plaintiff ceased to use the lane west of the gate. For more than 20 years, Plaintiff has 
acquiesced in the closure, never taking any action to object. This history of non-use and inaction 
show a clear intent on the part of Plaintiff to abandon the lane west of the gate. 
Scope of the Remaining Prescriptive Easement 
From the 1930's through at least the mid-1960's, the McNaughtens used the lane in 
connection with a large dairy and range cattle operation. During this period, use of the lane to 
run cattle, haul hay, move equipment, and park cars was common. The operation declined in 
scope from 1965 to 1980. However, use of the lane for these purposes continued, although to a 
lesser degree. By 1979, the McNaughtens had established the large access road north or their 
home and routinely used it to access their acreage and barn. 
After the death of Mr. McNaughten in 1980, the McNaughtens' use of the lane for 
agricultural purposes declined precipitously. At the time of Ms. McNaughten's death in 1984, 
that use had ceased. From 1984 and continuing to the present, Plaintiff has used the lane only as 
a driveway to allow tenants to access the rear of the McNaughten home and its accessory 
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apartment. 
The Court concludes that from 600 West to the gate, the Plaintiffs have a prescriptive 
easement for a driveway. The width of the driveway shall be commensurate with the width 
required by Heber City ordinances to accommodate one residence used for multi-family 
purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff failed to prove boundary by acquiescence. The Court grants judgment in favor 
of Defendants on this cause of action. Plaintiff prevails in part on the claim for prescriptive 
easement. The length, width, and scope of the easement are set forth in this ruling. 
The Court requests that counsel for Plaintiff prepare an order and judgment consistent 
with this ruling. The order shall contain a legal description of the easement granted herein. As 
stipulated by the parties, the Court orders Plaintiff to obtain and pay the costs of a survey 
identifying the prescriptive easement. 
DATED this ^ 5 day of November, 2005. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARTH LUNT, Trustee of the GARTH 0. 
LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAROLD LANCE and DIANA LANCE, 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 020500612 
DATED: NOVEMBER 15,2006 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This matter comes before the court on defendants' motion for new trial, or in the 
alternative to amend the judgment and/or take additional testimony. I have carefully read all 
motions and memoranda and have considered the oral arguments presented in this matter. I now 
deny defendants' motion. 
RULING 
1. Defendants Do Not Warrant a New Trial Under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "both the granting of, and the refusing to grant, a 
new trial is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge . . . ." Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988). However, before a court may exercise its discretion in granting a new 
trial, the moving party must present "a showing of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 292 n.2 (Utah 1962). 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides generally that a trial judge may grant a 
new trial for any of the following causes: (1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court; (2) 
misconduct of the jury; (3) accident or surprise; (4) newly discovered evidence; (5) excessive or 
inadequate damages; (6) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict; or (7) error in law. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(a). While defendants have not specifically stated the grounds under Rule 
59(a) for which they seek a new trial, it appears from their arguments that they believe the 
evidence provided in the original trial was insufficient to justify the verdict. 
There is no question that it is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses and the facts provided by them. State ex rel B. G, 2006 UT App 227 
(2006); see also State v. Robins, 142 P.3d 589, 593 (citing People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 
1342 (Cal. 1975) ("[I]t is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the 
credibility of a witness.")). Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the finding of 
whether an easement exists is "the type of highly fact-dependent question, with numerous 
potential fact patterns, which accords the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying 
the correct legal standard to the given set of facts." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 
1998). Though defendants claim that the testimony of plaintiff s witnesses is insufficient to 
satisfy the "clear and convincing" evidence standard necessary to grant a prescriptive easement, 
Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), Judge Pullan was in the best 
position to make that determination. 
In Judge Pullan's November 28, 2005, ruling (hereinafter the "ruling"), he acknowledges 
that the testimony of defendants' witnesses was directly contradicted by testimony from 
plaintiffs witnesses. Ruling, pp. 3-10. Said differently, Judge Pullan was not able to harmonize 
2 
the testimony of the various witnesses of the parties. However, after weighing the evidence and 
credibility of the witnesses, Judge Pullan concluded that plaintiff had successfully proven the 
elements of a prescriptive easement by "clear and convincing evidence." Ruling, p. 12. 
Referring to one of plaintiff s witnesses, Judge Pullan noted that "the testimony of Mr. Eldon 
Carlisle . . . was particularly credible." Ruling, p. 13. However, referring to the testimony of one 
of defendants' witnesses, Judge Pullan stated, "the weight of the evidence demonstrates clearly 
and convincingly otherwise." Ruling, p. 12. 
That contradictory evidence was presented throughout the trial does not mean that the 
evidence in favor of granting the prescriptive easement was not clear and convincing. Every trial 
contains contradictory evidence. That is the nature of the adversarial legal system. It is the 
primary responsibility of the trial judge to weigh and judge the credibility of competing witness 
testimony and to make decisions thereon. Defendants' "sincere and compelling belief that the 
trial judge made an incorrect ruling does not warrant a new trial. 
Defendants' second challenge is that Judge Pullan's involvement with the Heber City 
Planning Commission with respect to this property warrants a new trial. Though neither party 
addressed Judge Pullan's involvement with the Heber City Planning Commission in great detail 
in their memoranda, it appears from oral argument that his involvement as a member of the 
planning commission did not create a bias or prejudice which justifies a new trial in this matter. 
As Chairman of the planning commission, Judge Pullan was one of several members of that body 
who dealt with the issue of plaintiff s property. He did not act alone. Additionally, at the 
beginning of the trial Judge Pullan remembered his previous involvement with plaintiffs 
property and asked the parties if they objected to his trying the case. At that time, neither party 
objected. Having failed to object at that time, when the issue was squarely addressed to the 
parties by Judge Pullan, plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain. Judge Pullan's previous 
involvement with plaintiffs property does not warrant a new trial. 
2. Defendants Are Not Entitled To Be Relieved From or Amend the Judgment Based 
on Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states six reasons for which a party may 
be relieved from judgment. While the first five reasons deal with specific circumstances and 
events, the sixth reason serves as a residuary clause, stating that a party may be relieved from 
judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 60(b)(6). Since defendants have not alleged any of the first five clauses of Rule 60(b), 
the court must assume that they intend to gain relief from the judgment based on the residuary 
clause of Rule 60(b)(6). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the residuary clause found in Rule 60(b)(6) 
"embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than those listed in subdivisions 
(1) through [(5)]; second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion be made within 
a reasonable time." Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Ass '«, 657 P.2d 1304, 1307. 
Defendants clearly have complied with the first and third requirements established by the Utah 
Supreme Court. However, defendants have not complied with the second requirement because 
their Rule 60(b)(6) motion fails to state a reason that justifies relief. Defendants' "sincere and 
compelling belief that plaintiff in fact did not use the lane in the manner asserted by plaintiffs 
witnesses and found by the Court" is insufficient to justify relief. Instead, it appears that 
defendants are attempting to use Rule 60(b) as an appeal to the trial court from the court's own 
ruling and judgment. Defendants had their opportunity at trial to show that plaintiff did not use 
the lane in the manner asserted by plaintiffs witnesses, but failed satisfactorily to do so. After 
°{3 I 
both parties presented their case, Judge Pullan found in plaintiffs favor with regard to the 
prescriptive easement. Defendants simply have no reason which justifies amending or relieving 
them from the judgment. 
Conclusion 
I deny defendants' motion. Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiffs counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this (5 day of November, 2006. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Garth l.unt. : 
. . . : Ruling 
vs. : Date: May 3,2006 
Harold Lance, : Case Number: 020500612 
Respondent : Presiding Ju age janu> K. rI a> ior 
This matter comes before the Court, sitting as a "reviewing judge" by certification from 
for Rule 63 Removal of Judge" filed by the Petitioner. 
Rule 63(b)(3)(A) requires this Court to determine if the motion aiiu uiiiua\ n arc umciy 
i'ka '\e;I > L>ood faith and legally sufficient. Each requirement will be discussed. 
Rule 63(b)(1)(A) states: 
"A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to 
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a 
certificate that the motion is filed in good faith and shall be 
supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show bias, 
prejudice or conflict of interest." 
Rule 63(b)(1) (B) states further that the motion must be filed not later than 20 days after 
the moving party discovered the grounds for the motion. 
1 hi>« ease was tried hi fore Jink1!1 PIIIIIIN on Noventibni 1 "' O^OS Judge Pullan entered a 
Ruling on November 23, 2005. Oral argument on objections to a proposed order from that ruling 
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was heard on February 16, 2006. In the middle of the first day of trial, November 1, 2005, Judge 
Pullan noted, on the record, that "[i]n chambers I indicated that when I was the County Attorney 
for Wasatch County, I was consulted about the boundary line issue. My recollection is in this 
general area. I have no recollection with whom I talked." The parties made an affirmative 
determination at that time that they had no concerns about a possible conflict of interest. The 
Judge's ruling was that although the Plaintiff had failed to establish a boundary by acquiescence 
the claim for a prescriptive easement had been established, in part. The Plaintiff was ordered to 
obtain and pay the costs of a survey to identify the prescriptive easement. After oral argument on 
February 16, 2006 the Court stated, further, that the easement was to be 20 feet in width and 
measured from the center line of the street, east to 600 West. In early March, 2006, while doing 
research to prepare the required easement on of the Defendants discovered that when Judge 
Pullan was the Wasatch County Attorney in 1998 the property considered in this case was before 
the Heber City Planning Commission for a requested zone change. Judge Pullan was the acting 
chair of the commission when the commission recommended a zone change as requested by 
Moneves Boren. Ms. Boren subsequently testified in the trial of this case. 
This Court has carefully reviewed Judge Pullan's Ruling. He necessarily made extensive 
findings of fact about the historic use and condition of the property from the late 1920's through 
the present. The past, present or future zoning classification of the area was not considered or 
relevant to his conclusion that from the 1930's through at least the mid-1970's there was open, 
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notorious, continuous and adverse use of the subject lane for more than 20 years to establish a . 
prescriptive right in favor of the Plaintiff. 
File first question raised by this motion is whether the requisite 20 day period began with 
Judge Pullan's disclosure during the first day of trial or whether the period should begin when 
Ms I ance disco v ered that Ii idge • I i illan se .: ' " e Planning Commission \ vhen 
a request to re-zone the property was recommended i». :iJ -*•  n j focus of the Defendant's 
complaint is not upon the substance of Juagc i «,4«n ., /«!;.... L .. ..^estions whether there is an 
appearance of impropriety because he was called upon to impartially consider the testimony of 
Ms. Boren, the applicant in the zone change and a witness during this trial. There is no 
the trial that he had no recollection of any other involvement with the property. The zoning 
hearing preceded the trial by more than seven years. Nevertheless, because .irj ....... . _.- /.-.•. 
to the common participation of Ms. Boren in both instances it is reasonable that the 20 day period 
commence from when it was discovered that Judge Pullan was involved in both proceedings. 
I his ni i Dtion w as filed on I\. larch 24 2006 just ni lie days after Ms. I -ance received the . 
documentation from Heber City that indicated Judge Pullan's participation," Fhe motion is, 
U i j r e u j - _ . iii.^'if. 
This motion is accompanied by the affidavit of Diana Lance, In paragraph 13 she states 
"I am filing the accompanying Motion to Disqualify based on a good-iaun ; du i iiuu u.v. judge's 
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impartiality in this matter can reasonably be questioned." The Court will accept this portion of 
the affidavit as the requisite certification under the rule. 
The unusual dilemma presented by this motion is that it does not seek to merely conclude 
the prospective involvement of Judge Pullan, the moving party seeks a determination that a trail 
already concluded was tainted and should be set aside. No specific references to the trial, written 
ruling or subsequent proceedings have been made to demonstrate actual bias or prejudice. Rule 
63 addresses the prospective involvement of a judge and is not intended to determine 
proceedings already concluded. Questions about a trial already conducted and a ruling already 
rendered must be determined by either the appellate process or through Rule 60, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The moving party addresses only the appearance of impropriety. The available record is 
that Judge Pullan had no recollection of the previous proceeding involving the same witness. 
Nevertheless, this motion would, at the least, remind him of those proceedings. This Court 
concludes that there may at least be an appearance of impropriety should he continue with the 
case under these circumstances. 
Accordingly, while this Court declines to set aside the trial or ruling of Judge Pullan, this 
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matter will be reassigned to Judge Anthony W. Schofield for such other proceedings as shall be 
appropriate. 
Dated this 3 
Judge Jaj 
Fourth/Judicial 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
, '^m.H toi f i r PlainlilV 
Randy B. Birch 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, I Jtah 84111 
Counsel for the Defendants: 
Kraig J. Powell 
2 South Main Street, Suite _-;J 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Mailed this _day of /ASK,,, A 2006, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
Court Clerk 
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I ell J 1 
Testimony of 
Elden Carlisle 
MR. GREENWOOD: Well, I'll probably take 10, 15 minutes 
just on cross examination. 
THE COURT: And you'll be five minutes? 
MR. GREENWOOD: Five or ten. 
T H E C 0 U R T : 01 :  a} , W : • J ] ] :i e c i ] ; a t 1 2 : 3 0 f : :i " J i 11 I c : 1: i . 
Mr. Ca r 1 i s 1 e, if you'll come forward. 
MR. BIRCH: Or earlier if were done that, I hope. 
THE COURT: You/] 1 need to come right here first, sir. 
Raise your r i gI It hand, and take an oath. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimoi ly 
V J U shall give in the matter now before this Court shall be the 
• i 111: I , 1 1 i e w 1 I c: ] = t r i 111 i a i I d i I c t h i i i g b i I 1: t h e t r u 11 I , s o h e "1 p y o i i 
-.od? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Carlisle. If you'll take the 
••'itness stand. 
ELDON CARLISLE 
having been first duly sworn, 
t e s t i f j e s a s f o ] 3 o w s i 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY: MR. BIRCH: 
Q, Mr. Carlisle, I appreciate you being here today. I know 
i t's probably not what you do for a fun time. On the other hand, 
i t's interesting. I hope you've enjoyed at least ii i par t. Could. 
you tell the Court your name, please? 
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A. Eldon Carlisle. 
Q. How old are you, Mr. Carlisle? 
A. I'm 88. 
Q. How long have you lived in Heber? 
A. Most all the time. I was away three-and-a-half years in 
the Army. 
Q. Okay. When were you in the military? 
A. From Ml to ^96. 
Q. From Ml to how long? 
A. From Ml to M6. 
Q. Oh, M6, okay. That was the longest stint I had ever 
heard of for a minute. 
A. Yeah, longest years. 
Q. Seemed like that long maybe. All right. Did you know 
the McNaughtons? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Link McNaughton in particular? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How did you know Link? 
A. We were neighbors. 
Q. Okay. Where did you live back then? 
A. At 218 West Center. 
Q. Not too far from where you live now, is it? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Okay". When you -- how old -- were you and Link the same 
1 age in school? 
2 A No, Lincoln was about a year, a year-and-a-half older 
3 tl ian I was . 
4 Q, Okay. So did you guys -- were you friends? 
5 1 i ' : ! 
6 Q Okay. 
' I MR. BIRCH: I just noticed we're missing a photograph, 
your Honor. I don't know --
MR. GREENWOOD: Does the Court have it? 
THE COURT' I c ic :»i r 1 ., Counsel. 
MR. BIRCH: Did it fall? I don't see it fallen. 
ME GREENWOOD Wl ] i :1: < >i n • i ; i t? 
MR. BIRCH: It's 5-B. 
THE COURT: It's 5-B. 
MR. GREENWOOD: We will look diligently and see if we've 
g<~>t 5-B. Your Honor, my mistake. I had it (inaudible). Sorry, 
r: idy. 
MR. BIRCH: Just trying to keep track of things, your 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
21 | Q. BY MR. BIRCH: Okay. I've got these photographs over 
here, if you want to pull them off and bring them over. Are you 
i .^miliar with this lane that we're talking about here today? I'm 
I d i i i g y o u E x 1 I i b i t 5 - A, D o y o i i r e c o g i I i z e 11 I a t p r o p e i t y ? 
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1 Q. What is that? 
2 A. That's on the south side of the McNaughton house. 
3 Q. Is that where Link lived? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Okay. Do you see a lane in that picture? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Did you ever have occasion to go travel that lane? 
8 A. I used to go down there occasionally with Lincoln when 
9 he drove his cows down there. 
10 Q. So you — 
11 A. When we were boys. 
12 Q. When you were boys. So that would have been — 
13 A. Several years ago. 
14 Q. - - a few years ago, okay. You drove cattle down that — 
15 this is like periodically, daily, how often did you do that? Do 
16 you recall? 
17 A. Well, I can't tell you how often, but occasionally 
18 during the summer we did. 
19 Q. Okay. Do you remember how many years you did that for? 
20 A. No, I can't remember how many years, but it was several 
21 years. 
22 Q. Okay. Did you see anybody else ever use that lane? 
23 A. The Whitts did. 
24 Q. Okay. What did you see them do with it? 
2T5 A. When we were boys and after we grew up, then as long as 
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1 the Whitts lived there. 
2 J Q. Okay. What did they do on that lane -- along that lane? 
3 A. They had access to their barn that was down at the end 
4 of the lane. 
5 Q. Okay. When the McNaughtons took their cows down it, how 
6 far down the lane did they go? 
7 A. Oh, it was probably approximately a fourth of a block, 
8 maybe a third of a block. 
9 1 Q. Then where did the McNaughtons go? 
10 A. Then they went in the gate on the north side of the lane 
11 into their property. 
12 Q. Okay. So they went down the lane and turned to the 
13 north into their own property? 
14 A. Right. 
15 Q. Okay. Did you ever hear anyone object to either the 
16 Whitts or the McNaughtons using that lane? 
17 A. No, I didn't. 
18 Q. Did you ever hear anyone — well, strike that. Any 
19 other use of that property? Did you ever see any hunters, 
2 0 fisherman, rocket scientists go up and down that lane? Any other 
21 purpose? 
22 A. Well, we probably did when we were children. We'd go 
23 down that lane and climb over the fence and go swimming in the 
2 4 canal. 
25 Q. Okay. 
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1 A. Then there was probably some fisherman, but I couldn't 
2 tell you whether there was or wasn't. 
3 Q. And I'm just asking what you recall, okay9 How about --
4 since you got back from the mil -- since you were released from 
5 the military, have you had occasion to go out to this property? 
6 A. Yes, occasionally when the McNaughtons would bring their 
7 cattle from the north field down there for fall or some such 
8 thing as for feed it off. 
9 Q. Okay. Bear with me here. You said when you were a kid, 
10 so this would have been before 1941; is that correct? 
11 A. Yeah, I think so. 
12 Q. Okay. Then in 1941 you were in the military? 
13 A. That's right. 
14 Q. Through M6, and subsequent to that you -- what have you 
15 observed along that lane? So say since the y50's what have you 
16 observed along the lane? 
17 A. Well, just the lane was there and McNaughtons went back 
18 and forth on it probably and probably the Whitts. I don't 
19 remember when the Whitts died. 
20 Q. Okay. As long as they were alive you remember seeing 
21 them on the lane? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 MR. BIRCH: Okay. I have no further questions, your 
24 Honor. 
25 /// 
1 
2 
3 
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11 
12 
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14 
15 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
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CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GREENWOOD: 
Q. Eldon, you remember seeing any willow trees next to that 
common lane? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Describe to the Court the willow trees. 
A. Well, a tree that was up closer to the house was on the 
north side of the lane. I'd say these willow trees down here on 
the bottom was down by the canal at the end of the lane. 
Q. All right. Were there any willow trees — 
A. Not at the end of the lane, but at the end of Whitts' 
property. 
Q. So it wasn't the end of the lane, but the end of the 
property 
A. 
Q. 
the hous 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
? 
Right. 
Were there any willow trees next to the house, closer to 
e? 
To the McNaughton house? 
Yes. 
Well, there's one not too far from the west corner of 
the McNaughton house. I don't see it in here, unless this is the 
branches 
Q
* 
A. 
Q. 
of it come over here. 
How old are you? Are you 86? 
I'm 88. 
Oh, 88. So you worked for the Whitts, right? 
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1 A. No, I didn't work for the Whitts. 
2 Q. Did you -- tell me again how you lived. Did you -- you 
3 knew -- you worked for the McNaughtons, then9 
4 A. I was -- the McNaughtons. 
5 Q. Okay. You worked for the McNaughtons, right? 
6 A. As far as being an enemy of the Whitts, I wasn't an 
7 enemy of the Whitts. I was friendly with everybody. 
8 Q. Did you ever have a chance to see Mr. Whitt and 
9 Mr. McNaughton interact? 
10 A. Yes, I seen them together, but I never did see them 
11 arguing or anything. 
12 Q. Did you ever see them using the lane together? 
13 A. Well, I don't remember seeing them passing each other at 
14 the lane, but they both used the lane. 
15 Q. Who do you think owned the lane? 
16 A. Well, I imagine it come off --
17 MR. BIRCH: Objection, foundation. 
18 THE COURT: Sustained. 
19 Q. BY MR. GREENWOOD: Who do you think spent more time m 
20 the lane, the Whitts or the McNaughtons? 
21 A. Well, probably the Whitts. They lived closer. 
22 Q. What makes you say the Whitts spent more time in the 
23 lane? 
24 A. Sir? 
25 Q. They spent -- they lived closer? 
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1 A. Yeah, the Whitts lived — they had — their house was 
2 Dust on the south side of the lane. McNaughtons' house, when we 
3 were boys, wasn't there. They lived in town. 
4 Q. This was in 19 -- give me the year. 
5 A. Oh, I don't — Lincoln built that house probably m M6 
6 or 7. 
7 Q. Do you recall the property in 1930? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Before the basement was built? 
10 A. That's right. 
11 Q. Was there a fence that extended all the way to 6th West9 
12 A. There was, except there was a gate m it. As far as the 
13 fence, 1 guess you would call the gate part of the fence. 
14 Q. But it extended all the way from the canal all the way 
15 up to 6th West — 6th North? 
16 A. That's right. 
17 Q. That fence was taken down when they built the basement 
18 house, right? 
19 A. I don't remember. 
20 Q. We're talking about Exhibit 5-A, this picture. Do you 
21 recognize the house there? 
22 A. I -- the property would run west of here. 
23 Q. But picture in your mind 1930. Would there have been a 
24 fence that ran all the way down to the road? 
25 A. There would have been a fence that would have come from 
-123-
1 here up to here. 
2 Q. Show the Court. 
3 A. It would — 
4 MR. BIRCH: If I may, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: You may. 
6 THE WITNESS: — have been -- run up to the — it would 
7 run up clear to the road. 
8 THE COURT: And how far would that fence have been from 
9 the house? 
10 THE WITNESS: Well, I — 
11 MR. GREENWOOD: In terms of (inaudible) size distance. 
12 THE COURT: Size. I know the house wasn't there, but — 
13 THE WITNESS: Well, I've never paid any attention how 
14 close the house was built to the fence. 
15 THE COURT: Would the fence have been on the north side 
16 of that lane, then? 
17 THE WITNESS: That fence would have been on the north 
18 side of this lane, but it would have been on the south side of 
19 the house. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
21 Q. BY MR. GREENWOOD: And it would have been, would you 
22 say, three or four feet from the house? 
23 A. I would say so. 
24 Q. You wouldn't say 10 or 15, would you? 
25 A. No, I wouldn't think that would be that far. 
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1 I Q. Now along that line there were some willow trees. Were 
2 there some willow trees along that fence line behind the house? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Do you remember how big they were back in --
5 A. They was pretty big trees. 
6 Q. Okay. They have been there for awhile? 
7 I A. Yes, they've been there as far back as I can remember. 
Q. Did you ever see the trees trimmed? 
9 I A. No. 
10 Q. Who was it that — you ever see anyone hang things on 
11 the trees? 
12 A. No, I never seen anything hanging on the trees. 
13 Q. Which side of the fence were the trees growing on? 
14 A. Well, I'd say they was pretty close to the fence line, 
15 but they might have been just slightly on the north side of the 
16 fence. 
17 Q. North side of the fence, which would be the McNaughton 
18 side? 
19 A. On the McNaughton side. 
20 Q. You think that the McNaughtons consider that a boundary? 
21 A. I don't know whether they considered it a boundary or 
22 not. 
23 Q. Now in 1950 do you remember seeing this gate between the 
24 willow trees? 
25 MR. BIRCH: If I may, your Honor. 
-125-
1 THE COURT: You may. 
2 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't remember whether it was 
3 there or not. It probably was. As far as I remember the gate 
4 was there forever. 
5 Q. BY MR. GREENWOOD: Okay. Describe the use of that gate 
6 when you saw it being used. 
7 A. Well, the McNaughtons drove cattle through it and they 
8 drove their wagon through it. In the winter the Whitts would 
9 open the gate and let their stock through to get water in the 
10 canal. 
11 Q. Now let's talk about this use. Are we talking going 
12 north and south --
13 A. Right. 
14 Q. — taking the cattle through? 
15 A. Right. 
16 Q. Did you ever see the McNaughtons bring cattle on their 
17 property by any other way? 
18 A. Yes, there was a gate over on the south side of their 
19 property, which would be west where the -- this is the one. Down 
20 by these trees the Whitt property cornered and went south, and 
21 the McNaughton property still joined (inaudible). There was a 
22 little gate over on the south side of the McNaughton property 
23 that they could get their cows through, but they couldn't get a 
24 wagon through. 
25 Q. Okay. This was 19 — what years? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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12 
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15 
16 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the 
the 
A. 
Q. 
Well, it's been forever. 
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Forever. Did you ever see the cows being brought onto 
McNaughton property from 6th West? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. I even helped do them. 
Other than through this common lane, ma 
north? 
A. 
ybe further to 
No, I don't remember. There may have been a little wire 
gate there, but I don't remember using it. 
Q. 
weren' 
A. 
Q. 
that t 
two 
the 
A. 
Q. 
wi 
A. 
Now there were some willow trees out fr 
t there? 
That's true. That's true. 
There was a gate between those two will 
rue? 
It could have been between the trees. 
And that the cows were led through that 
How trees in the front on 6th West? 
They could have been, but they was also 
wooden gate down the lane. 
Honor. 
there 
MR. GREENWOOD: Just one minute. Just 
Could I have just a moment? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Counsel confers with client) 
MR. GREENWOOD: That's all I have, your 
MR. BIRCH: Thank you, your Honor. You 
if you want. I'm not going to look at it. 
ont on 6th West, 
ow trees; isn't 
gate between the 
brought through 
one moment, your 
Honor. 
can leave it 
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1 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. BIRCH: 
3 Q. Mr. Carlisle, for me it's almost enjoyable to do some of 
4 these kinds of cases because I get to talk to people who are --
5 who have experienced things I've only read about. I appreciate 
6 your time here today. You indicated you were born in what vear? 
7 A. In 1917. 
8 Q. Okay, 1917. So when you said you were running cows up 
9 and down this lane as a kid, we were talking in the 1920's and 
10 N30's? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. So that lane existed clear back in the A20's and '30's? 
13 A. It was there as far back as I can remember. 
14 MR. BIRCH: Okay. Thank you. No further questions. 
15 MR. GREENWOOD: Redirect? 
16 THE COURT: Briefly. 
17 MR. BIRCH: I'm just going to fix the pictures. 
18 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
19 BY MR. GREENWOOD: 
20 Q. In the ^20's and x30's were there cars parked on that 
21 lane? 
22 A. I think Whitts had a car. 
23 Q. The Whitts parked a car on that lane? 
24 A. I think though, and then I think they parked it in the 
25 garage that was on the south side of the lane. It was an old 
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? 
We would go down there if -- like I said, I had younger 
and sisters down there, and my parents were there and we 
would come over here to do shopping and that and we would call on 
them. 
Q. 
you mean 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
that nee 
A. 
over to 
Okay. Did you ever visit -- when you say call on them, 
visit your parents? 
Pardon? 
When you say call on them, do you mean visit them? 
Visit them. 
Okay. Did you ever help with the -- any of the chores 
ded to be done? 
Just milking the cows. When Link would -- was working 
the mines and it was cold in the morning and snowing and 
he had to leave so early, that when the sun come out I would go 
out and 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
milk. 
Do you remember what years that was? i 
That was in the M8 and M9's. 
But subsequent to 1955 how often have you visited the 
site? After 1955 how often did you go by? 
A. 
Q-
A. 
took the 
Q. 
Often. I don't know. 
Okay. 
We — our children was here in school, and then they 
school out of Wallsburg and we moved over here, and --
Do you recall --
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1 A. I am. 
2 Q. How long do you -- do you recall when you first observed 
3 that lane? 
4 A. When I went there in M8. 
5 Q. Okay. Was it being used on a regular basis? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Can you tell me what you observed in 1948 its use --
8 well, I'm talking like a lawyer. Let me take a deep breath and 
9 I'll fix that. What did they use the lane for back in 1948? 
10 A. The Whitts used it to travel down to their — the back 
11 of their house to the garage to park their car. We used it 
12 down — to go down through there to park — down the side of the 
13 lane for we didn't have room in the front. Well, and when the 
14 snow got deep in there we couldn't get out anyway. We used it to 
15 park cars. In the summer we used it to take our hay back to the 
16 barn. We used it to put cattle down in there and take them out 
17 to take them to the north field, just the general use. 
18 Q. Okay. How long did they use that property to, as you 
19 put, to put cattle down in there? 
20 A. I don't know that they've ever stopped. 
21 Q. Okay. When was the last time you visited the property? 
22 A. Yesterday. 
23 Q. Okay. Did you have an opportunity to walk that lane and 
2 4 refresh your memory? 
25 A. I did. 
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1 went from north to south? 
2 A. I did. 
3 Q. And how far was that? 
4 A. From the chimney back there on the apartment over to the 
5 wooden fence there was 35 feet. 
6 Q. Okay. How about from 6th West where the asphalt is, how 
7 far back do you believe the ext -- well, let me ask you this. 
8 You've talked about a barn. You've talked about taking hay back 
9 there. How far back -- to what monument or what existed -- how 
10 far back did that lane go? To what did it stop or where did it 
11 stop? 
12 A. Do you mean where it stopped that we used it, or where 
13 the lane stopped? 
14 Q. No, where you've used it. Was there a --
15 A. As I --
16 Q. — building or something? 
17 A. Pardon? 
18 Q. Was there a building or something? 
19 A. No. There was all the buildings over on the Whitt side 
2 0 went clear back down in there. We had the fence down on our 
21 side, and there was a gate in there. 
22 Q. Okay. Bear with me. When you say our side, let me show 
23 you on Exhibit 5-D, when you say there was a fence down there, 
24 are you referring to this fence here? 
25 A. Bring it up, I — 
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1 Q. Let me get it closer. Sorry about that. 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. There was a gate in that, you say? 
4 A. There was a gate down in this fence that went down here 
5 below that tree. 
6 Q. Okay. Do you recall how far from the road approximately 
7 that fence was -- or excuse me, the gate, the gate was? 
8 A. Yesterday I tried to line it up with where we went in to 
9 where — the barn, and it was 235 feet from the edge of the 
10 asphalt down to where I figured it went across to the barn. 
11 Q. Okay. Do you recall — would that have been at the east 
12 or the west side of the fence — the gate; do you recall, just 
13 about there? 
14 A. Of the gate that's in the fence line? 
15 Q. The gate that isn't there anymore, the one that used to 
16 be there, do you recall whether -- you said 235 feet, right? 
17 A. Right. 
18 Q. Would that have been which side of the gate? 
19 A. It -- we were -- I was over on the --
20 Q. The gate ran — 
21 A. -- north -- or the south side --
22 Q. -- east and west. 
23 A. -- of the fence line. 
24 Q. Right. 
25 A. I was on"the north side of the fence line. 
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1 Q. Right. 
2 A. It runs east and west. 
3 Q. Right. 
4 A. And I was over on the north side of the fence line. 
5 Q. Okay. So at 235 feet there was a gate? 
6 A. Right. 
7 Q. All right. Very good. Now after 1955 you say -- what 
8 use of that lane did you observe? 
9 A. That was where we took the cattle and the hay and what 
10 we needed to do out in back that we got in. 
11 Q. Did that continue every year? 
12 A. Yes, and we had no other way to get onto the property. 
13 Q. Okay. Is there a barn there now? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Excuse me, is there a McNaughton barn there now? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Okay. Do you recall when that was destroyed or 
18 demolished? 
19 A. I think that was moved in the early 1990fs. Bliss 
20 Taylor took it, and it is out to the north fields. 
21 Q. Okay. So up until the 1990's how did they access that 
22 barn? 
23 A. Who? 
24 Q. Anyone. 
25 A. We came down the lane and went through the gate over to 
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1 the barn. 
2 Q. Okay. Do you recall the Whitts having a barn out there 
3 towards the end of the lane? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Okay. Do you recall where it was located? 
6 A. I just remember it was out in the field. I don't know 
7 how far it was or anything about it because we turned off and 
8 went in to our barn. 
9 Q. Okay. So you went towards the Whitt barn and turned off 
10 into your barn? 
11 A. Right. 
12 Q. Okay. Again, that use continued until the 1990's 
13 sometime; is that correct? 
14 A. Right. 
15 Q. Do you recall anyone else ever using that lane? School 
1 6 c h i l d r e n , swimming? 
17 A. No, I d o n ' t . 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. I did witness the — hmm, the — go down that lane one 
2 0 time --
21 Q. The Lances? 
22 A. The Lances, thank you. Go down that lane one time with 
23 the trailer and a horse, and they didn't go in. They just went 
2 4 down to the gate and then came back. 
25 Q. Okay. 
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1 A. Took their horses out. 
2 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 5-C -- well, 5-B, how's that? 
3 It might be a little easier. In that photograph can you see a 
4 pile of dirt? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Do you know when that was put there? 
7 A. No, I don't. I was there when it was put there. 
8 Q. Okay. Approximately when was it? 
9 A. Don't know. 
10 Q. Five years ago, 20 years ago? 
11 A. No, it wasn't 20 years ago. 
12 Q. Okay. Do you recall who put it there? 
13 A. The Lances. 
14 Q. Okay. Is it within the area that you have described as 
15 the lane? Did they put the dirt in the lane? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. 
18 A. Well, partially. 
19 Q. Okay. 
2 0 A. We had a white van out in the lane, and they dumped the 
21 rocks and the dirt, and we had to move them before we could get 
22 the van around so Trent could get out. 
23 Q. Okay. So you believe that was in the 1990's after 
24 Lances bought the property that that happened? 
25 A. Right. 
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pasture and was put in the barn? 
A. Well, the cattle weren't put in the barn, but the milk 
cows were. 
Q. Okay. Milk cows in the barn? 
A. That's right. 
Q. When was the last time he was milking cows? 
A. I don't remember. 
8 MR. GREENWOOD: Okay. Thank you. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Carlisle, thank you very much, sir. You 
10 are free to go. 
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
12 MR. BIRCH: We can take that lunch break at this time, 
13 your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Yeah. 
15 MR. BIRCH: It would be a natural time. 
16 THE COURT: The Court will be in recess. Counsel, 
17 let's — what I'd like to do is go out and see the property right 
18 now, if we can, and then we'll reconvene at 1:30 for further 
19 testimony. By way of direction to clients or the Lunts -- any 
20 representatives of the Lunts here? 
21 MR. BIRCH: Yes, Garth is here. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lunt, you can travel with your 
23 attorney out to the property. I'll follow behind in my vehicle. 
24 Mr. Greenwood, if you'll take your clients. I would like to go 
25 out and see the property so that I have a better understanding of 
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it as it exists 
or x30's or 
zh±s that you'11 
going to hear 
Id be inappropriate for me to do that. If I 
11 pose them to your Counsel 
out there about this case. 
f but I can't 
So I'll follow 
if you can lead the way and we'll take a few 
We'11 then take a lunch brea 
Thank you, your Honor. 
GREENWOOD: Can we leave our items . 
COURT: 
BIRCH: 
COURT: 
BIRCH: 
You may. 
Can we lock -- make sure it 
We'll lock it up. 
Thanks. 
COURT BAILIFF: All rise. 
(Noon recess) 
THE 
Lance 
COURT: We're back in the matter of 
k: and reconvene 
in the courtroom? 
gets locked? 
Garth Lunt vs. 
The record should reflect that the parties are 
together with their respective Counsel. 
may continue 
the des 
MR. 
THE 
BIRCH: 
COURT: 
k. Raise you 
Your Honor, we'd call Garth 
Mr. Birch, you 
Lunt. 
Mr. Lunt, if you'll come forward, sir, to 
r right hand and take an oath. 
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1 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
2 you shall give in the matter now before this Court shall be the 
3 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
4 God? 
5 THE WITNESS: I do. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Please take the witness 
7 stand. 
8 GARTH LUNT 
9 having been first duly sworn, 
10 testifies as follows: 
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. BIRCH: 
13 Q. Garth, could you tell the Court your name and where it 
14 is you currently reside? 
15 A. My name is Garth Lunt. I reside at 4090 Branch Street, 
16 No. 2, San Diego, California, 92103. 
17 Q. Okay. Mr. Lunt, are -- do — what's your relationship 
18 to the Garth Lunt Family Trust or living trust? 
19 A. It's a private trust that I have set up. 
20 Q. Okay. Does it own any property here in Heber City? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. Where is that property located? 
23 A. At 205 North, 6th West. 
24 Q. Okay. So when we refer to the Lunt property, we're 
25 referring to the property owned by the trust/ is that correct? 
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1 A. That's correct. 
2 Q. Okay. When did you obtain title to that property? 
3 A. In 1977. 
4 Q. Okay. Who did you buy that property from? 
5 A. That property was bequeathed to me by my deceased 
6 brother. 
7 Q. Excuse me. So it was given to you by your deceased 
8 brother? 
9 A. Correct. 
10 Q. And before — how — and before he had it, who owned the 
11 property, if you know? 
12 A. Well, actually my parents lived there, but I think it 
13 was in 1972, my parents put it -- all the property in my name. 
14 Q. Okay. So how long had your parents owned this property? 
15 A. Oh, gee, before 1947. 
16 Q. Okay. What happened in 1947? What caused you to recall 
17 that? 
18 A. In 1947 my father already owned it and they were going 
19 to build a house. 
20 Q. Okay. So in 1947 they were going to or they did start 
21 to build? 
22 A. They did between 1945 and 1947. 
23 Q. Okay. So during M5 to M 7 they built a house? 
24 A. Correct. 
25 Q. Were you living at home at that time? Excuse me. Were 
-134-
1 I Q. Okay. Is that the house that was built in M5? 
2 A. Between M5 and M7. We built a basement first and then 
3 went up. 
4 Q. Okay. So M5 to M7 a basement was built in this house, 
5 but it was in that same location? 
6 A. Exactly. 
7 Q. Okay. Just to the south of the house do you see a lane 
8 or a driveway, however you describe it? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Okay. How long has that lane or driveway been there? 
11 A. Forever, as far as I know. 
12 Q. Okay. When do you first recall seeing this property? 
13 A. When the house was being built. 
14 Q. Okay. That would be 1945, then? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. How old are you, Garth? 
17 A. I'm 74. 
18 Q. Okay. Did you work on the house at all? 
19 A. Yes, I would say I was because we kept having a problem 
20 with water seeping in the basement, so we had to dig out around 
21 the basement and put pipes in to drain it. 
22 Q. And you helped with that? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. What was that lane used for in 1945 through 1950? 
25 A. Well, we used to take cattle and teams of horses up it 
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back to the barn and machinery. In the wintertime the 
y would have to come in from the north fields, and we'd 
down there. 
Okay. When was the most recent time that you saw this 
this property? 
Yesterday. 
Okay. At that time did you have occasion to measure the 
the lane? 
I did. 
Okay. Now what divides the lane from the Whitt 
9 
There's a fence and a line of locust trees. 
Okay. Is that the wooden fence that we've talked about? 
Yes. 
Okay. So how wide was the lane from the wooden fence 
over towards the house? 
A. 
Q. 
It's 34 feet. 
So 34 feet. Okay. Do you recall on the westerly end of 
that lane there are some -- are there buildings built along that 
wooden fence? 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Okay. There is also another fence that runs parallel to 
the wooden fence, but picks up at about where the end — building 
ends and 
A. 
goes further west; is that correct? 
Correct. 
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1 Q. Okay. Did you have an opportunity to measure the 
2 distance between that building and that northern fence? 
3 A. Yes, I did. 
4 Q. Okay. Do you recall how wide that was? 
5 A. The total down to that fence was — 
6 Q. No, I'm trying to go width still. I'm just measuring 
7 the — 
8 A. Oh, the width. 
9 Q. width at the western end. 
10 A. It's 35 feet. 
11 Q. Okay. Now is that lane different today than it was back 
12 in 1945, to the best of your recollection? 
13 A. It's different because now there's all kind of debris in 
14 it. 
15 Q. Okay. Back in 1945 through M7 how far back did the 
16 lane go? 
17 A. Total to where the old — like out the old gate was. 
18 Q. Well, tell me this. Was there some structure back there 
19 to which the lane ended? 
20 A. Went back to Whitt's barn. 
21 Q. Okay. Now the Whitt barn is no longer there, is it? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. Do you recall when that was removed or demolished? 
2 4 A. No, it just fell down for years and years and years and 
25 finally just --
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around the house and visited family. 
you have occasion to see the use of that --
calling the lane? 
Oh, of course. 
Okay What 
THE COURT: 
MR. BIRCH: 
THE COURT: 
THE WITNESS 
hauling hay to their 
was the lane used for? 
I'm sorry, Counsel, this is after 1954? 
Correct. 
Okay. 
: It was used for -- again, the Whitts 
barn, me hauling hay to let's say my barn, 
equipment going up and down there. We had horses. We had range 
cattle that sometimes had to be brought in from the north fields 
to pasture it 
Q. 
cattle 
A. 
Q-
down. 
BY MR. BIRCH: And you were active in helping move that 
and — 
Yes. 
Okay Did 1 
was removed in 1991? 
A. 
Q. 
things 
A. 
had to 
Yes. 
Okay What 
was that lane 
Well, the 0" 
go back there 
do, and there 
would go back 
bhat type of activity continue until the barn 
other uses was that lane -- what other 
used for? 
ther things it was used for, if the county 
and spray thistles, which they often had to 
were times when the canal needed cleaning, they 
and cli Ban it and throw all the dirt up on the 
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1 was hunters or something going up and down there -- fisherman. I 
2 don't know. I don't see them all. I wasn't here. 
3 MR. GREENWOOD: Okay. But you wouldn't call it a public 
4 easement, that's all I'm looking for. You'll stipulate it's not 
5 a public easement (inaudible) claiming for. 
6 MR. BIRCH: Maybe. I'll have to think about that. 
7 MR. GREENWOOD: Well, you think about it. He's 
8 testified that — 
9 THE COURT: Anything further? 
10 MR. GREENWOOD: Just a few more, your Honor. Would you 
11 like to take a break? 
12 THE COURT: No. Let's finish up with Mr. Lunt if we 
13 can. 
14 MR. GREENWOOD: Your Honor, when I use the word 
15 "easement," I'm using his — 
16 THE COURT: Understood. 
17 MR. GREENWOOD: His words. 
18 Q. BY MR. GREENWOOD: All right. Garth, you testified in 
19 your deposition that this use of the land now is no longer being 
20 used for milk — milking cows, correct? 
21 A. Correct, not milking cows, but if you go down there a 
22 current day you'll see cows and horses in there, calves being 
2 3 pastured. They came down the lane. 
24 Q. You testified that the real use of this is access to a 
25 back apartment; is that right? 
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rhe use of it is to get back to 
Well, you called this access a driveway for your 
isn't that true? 
Part of it. 
If you would describe it 
, not a pathway. 
, you would describe it as a 
I'd describe it as a lane. 
A lane. You testified p. 
from 600 West. 
That figure is just down 
d up to. 
Okay. You've testified H 
into the property. 
Yes, but with cattle and 
All right. You're aware 
obtained an electrical permit 
home 
A. 
built in 
in 
the 
the A 
util 
because 
I -- we 
Q. 
; isn't that true? 
When the home was built • 
about M7. I'll say the 
60's. At that time the e! 
reviously that it extends only 
to where that -- where the gate 
that the use was just egress and 
horses and hay and whatever. 
that in November of A88 is when 
for an apartment on the back of 
— all right. The home was 
apartment was put in on the --
Lectricity naturally and all 
ities were put in the apartment. They were not cut off 
my sister was living there taking care of my mother. So 
weren't getting like two < 
Your mother -- you didn'1 
electricity bills and that. 
: rent out the apartment until 
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we've got here in the courtroom, didn't you? 
A. 
Q. 
this gat 
Correct. 
And do you recall how far it is from the highway back to 
e where the no trespassing sign is put? Or is there a 
post? What were you measuring to; do you recall? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
measured 
asphalt? 
A. 
Q. 
I was measuring to a survey peg. 
Okay. 
At 160 feet. 
Okay. That was between -- there was a survey peg you 
to? How far was the survey peg off the highway, the 
Oh, 15 feet. 
Okay. So we've got the asphalt, we've got 15 feet to 
the survey peg, and then you measured to another survey peg --
A. 
Q. 
located 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
it a gat 
Q. 
You can 
the one 
A. 
Yeah, 160. 
— 160 — was 160, 162. Where is that second survey peg 
at approximately? 
About — 
Do you need a picture? I can --
-- nine feet down from where that -- the gate is, call 
e. The boards that go across. 
All right. Let me hand you — whoops — Exhibit 5-C. 
see the gate with the no trespassing sign on it. Is that 
you're referring to? 
Yes. 
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testified? 
A. 
Q. 
the hi 
A. 
Yes. 
L0 feet wire gate. 
approximately 10 
So if I added those numbers 
figures we 
feet past 
was 15 
re you 
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plus 162 to 
believe the 
going down 
ur reco 
this 
llection or 
the north, 
just went 
the 62 
up I'd come with 
ghway you believe that gate was; is that 
About 274 
MR. BIRCH 
feet. 
: Okay. I'll add 
No further questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT : Thank you. You 
THE WITNESS: Thank you, yo 
THE COURT 
MR. BIRCH 
THE COURT 
: You are free to 
He'll be here. 
All right. 
those up 
may step 
ur Honor. 
remain or 
correc 
again. 
down. 
go. 
you 
where 
through. 
how far off 
t? 
All right. 
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1 what was the property used for; do you know? 
2 A. No. 
3 I Q. Okay. So you say you ran cattle and hay into the ^60's. 
4 What building existed back when you first got out of the military 
5 in A51; do you recall? 
6 A. Mr. Whitt had a barn there and a lane there, and we had 
7 a basement home at that time. 
8 Q. Okay. Is that a basement home that exists where the 
9 house currently sits? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. It's been expanded and there's some sheds, but 
12 the house was there? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Okay. What was the lane used for? 
15 MR. GREENWOOD: Objection, foundation. 
16 THE COURT: Overruled, he may answer. 
17 THE WITNESS: It was used for us and Mr. Whitt to run 
18 fork -- or equipment, mowing machines inside, delivery rakes from 
19 one place to another. 
20 Q. BY MR. BIRCH: Okay. You indicated there was a Whitt 
21 barn at one end of it? 
22 A. Yes, at the end of the lane. 
23 Q. Which direction would that be from — 
24 A. West of the 6th South — 6th West. 
25 Q. Okay. Did there come a time when the McNaughtons built 
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How far back from the road do you believe that barn was 
From clean back to the oil where 6th West --
Yeah. 
— 200 and — about 247, 48 feet. 
Okay. At that point the lane to the west ended; is that 
Yes. 
What did Whitts do when they went down that lane? Where 
go? 
Back in their field. 
That would have been to the south? 
Yes. 
Okay. What did the McNaughtons do when they hit the end 
ane? 
They'd go on north. 
Okay. What was -- isn't there a fence between the 
Dn and the Whitt property? 
Yes. 
Back there? 
Yes. 
Hasn't there been there -- one there for as long as you 
can remember? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. So how did you get through the fence? 
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There was a gate that went down through Mr. Whitt's 
that we could go through the gate and back in to our 
All right. What would you -- what did you go down that 
or? 
When we wintered -- or weaned the calves we'd go down 
because the cows would be on this side of the fence, and 
we'd go through there and go through that gate to feed the calves 
we'd weaned. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
lane? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. Did you take equipment down that lane? 
Yes, a bob sleigh and a wagon. 
Okay. Did you ever take any hay equipment down that 
Yes, that would be the hay equipment. 
Okay. Any other use of that lane you can recall? 
No. 
Okay. Who used the lane? 
Just the people — me and whoever, but there was mostly 
just the people that lived there, me and Mr. Whitt. 
Q. 
and — 
about 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. Did -- was there any discussions between you 
do you recall ever having a discussion with Mr. Whitt 
using the lane? 
No. 
Okay. Was there any easement ever granted or any 
permission ever granted? 
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That's — 
As a matter of fact, did it look like this one? 
Yes. 
Okay. Just so they didn't think we were trying to do 
that with a 10-foot tape. Did you have an opportunity to measure 
the distance between the -- what is now asphalt and this fence 
that you 
east and 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
can see in Exhibit 5-B and 5-C, this fence that goes 
west? 
From the oil? 
Yeah. Was there a post or something back there? 
Yes. 
Okay. How far back is that? 
It's 175 feet from the oil back to the fence. 
Okay. To this fence right here? 
Yes. 
Okay. How much further past that fence did the old lane 
go to the Whitt barn? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
used the 
A. 
Q. 
barn --
About 62 feet to the gate where the barn was. 
Okay. Then how big was the gate? 
Oh, 10 or 12 feet. 
Okay. That was as far, then, as the McNaughtons ever 
property? 
Yes. 
Okay. Then how wide was it from the back of this 
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<ce sure I 
Counsel, let me stop you aga. 
understood that. 
at you've talked about goes back 
THE 
THE 
THE 
MR. 
was a gate. 
Q. 
THE 
THE 
WITNESS: 
COURT: 
WITNESS: 
BIRCH: 
WITNESS: 
COURT: 
BY MR. BIRCH 
the width? By that I 
fence -• 
A. 
Q. 
side of 
Exhibit 
A. 
Q. 
wide is 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes 
The fence 
how far? 
It's 175 feet from the oil 
And how far beyond 
It's 62 feet. 
Well, that's to the 
To the gate where 
All right. 
: Now did you have 
mean the distance 
-- of the lane? Okay. How far 
this 
5-D? 
It'; 
that was 1 
m . 
on 
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I just 
the south 
back to the 
the old Whitt 
gate, your Honor. There 
the barn 
a chance 
north and 
was. 
to measure 
south of the 
was it from 
barn over to this fence that we can see 
3 35 feet 
Okay. As yo 
that 
Iff 
— 
3 35 feet 
Okay, and 35 
Put 
u came down to the 
, it was 35. 
feet put you where 
you to the -- within four -
— by the 
the back 
here in 
road, how far 
; do you reca ill? 
- three or four feet of 
name, 
hand, 
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Counsel, if you'll approach the bench. 
(Short recess taken) 
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. What is your 
ma'am? 
MS. BOREN: Pardon? 
THE COURT: What is your name? 
MS. BOREN: Moneves Boren. 
THE COURT: Ms. Boren, if you could raise your right 
please, and take an oath right here. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you shall give in the matter now before this Court shall be the 
truth 
God? 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. You may take the 
witness stand. 
Counsel, before we begin, in chambers I indicated that 
when I was the county attorney for Wasatch County I was consulted 
about 
area. 
to my 
that? 
— 
a boundary line issue, my recollection is in this general 
I have no recollection with whom I talked. It's just come 
mind. 
THE WITNESS: Judge? 
THE COURT: Have you consulted with your clients about 
MR. BIRCH: I have, your Honor. I have consulted not 
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1 only with my client, but also the witnesses who are family and 
2 who have been involved in the dispute over the years. They've 
3 all indicated that you're a handsome fellow, but they don't 
4 recall seeing you at any time prior to today, and never consulted 
5 with you about this matter. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Greenwood9 
7 MR. GREENWOOD: The witness was going to say something. 
8 THE COURT: I'd like to hear from you first. 
9 MR. GREENWOOD: My clients have not been involved with 
10 you. They don't recognize you. They don't recall anything like 
11 that. All their property is in Heber City, so I don't know if 
12 you had jurisdiction (inaudible). 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. 
14 THE WITNESS: Could you speak a little louder or 
15 clearer. I can't understand you. 
16 THE COURT: I will do that, and I'll direct that the 
17 parties do that as well. 
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
19 THE COURT: And I'll speak up. Thank you very much. 
20 MONEVES BOREN 
21 having been first duly sworn, 
22 testifies as follows: 
2 3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. BIRCH: 
25 Q. Thank you for being here today, MonevesT Could you tell 
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THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. Please take the 
witness stand. 
"Slow 
BY MR. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
bounda 
MR. GREENWOOD: If I go too quick, your Honor, just say, 
down," okay? 
THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. 
DIANA LANCE 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
GREENWOOD: 
Please tell us your name. 
Diana Lance. 
Where do you reside, Diana? 
At 292 West Main in Midway. 
Do you own property in Heber City? 
I do. 
Describe that property to us. 
We own a little over nine acres between -- the south 
ry is actually 91 North, but off of 600 West. It starts at 
109 North and goes to about 205 North. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
How long have you owned that property? } 
Since 1991. 
When did you first become acquainted with that property? 
We were looking for property in the spring of 1991 to 
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I resided on -- I can't remember the address, but it was 
other side of the depot grounds when it was the depot 
s and the railroad tracks, Midway Lane. 
Are you familiar with the property that's in question 
namely property at 205 West, 6 -- 205 North 600 West? 
Yes. 
Describe to us that property. What is it there? 
That's my grandparents' home. 
Your grandparents were whom? 
Frank and Maude Whitt. 
Okay. Did you ever work for them? 
No, but I stayed with them lots. 
Tell us when you stayed with them. 
I stayed with them every weekend until I was probably 16 
Okay. I'm not going to look for ages here, but what 
-- what years would that be in? 
It would have been from probably -- I stayed there when 
real little. Probably from 1945 to 1957. 
Let me hand you an exhibit, Exhibit 5-A. In that photo 
appears to be a lane. Do you see that? 
Yes. 
Describe to us what that lane is that you see. 
That was the driveway to my grandparents' property. 
back fen -- their back way into their house was by my 
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grandfather's grainery on the -- they'd go in on the left there. 
Then the car sheds where they parked their cars was a little bit 
farther down on the left. Then the grainery was next. Then 
there was a open -- a gate that opened that went into a large 
corral, and then there was a huge barn there and an opening that 
came out from the corral on the other side into the field. 
Q. 
and ^50 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Do you remember any fences being present in the MO's 
's? 
Yes. 
Can you describe to the Court where those fences were? 
My grandmother had a fence around her property to keep 
the cattle and stuff off of her — out of her flowers and her 
garden. 
side to 
Q. 
! A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
It went around the whole front of the house, down the 
the back part where they went into the house. 
What was it made of? 
Wood. J 
Do you see it in that photo? Probably can't see it. 
No, but it should be there. 
Okay. All right. Were there any other — now that 
fence extended back to how far? 
A. 
i Q . 
A. 
Q. 
It only went back as far as the grainery. 
And how -- can you see the grainery in that photo? 
Not in this photo. 
Probably not. It went back to the grainery. Now you 
mentioned that there was a gate --
-266-
1 I A. Not -- excuse me, I take that back. It was not the 
2 grainery, it was right next to the fence -- the fence where we 
3 went into the back of their house, my grandfather had a -- like a 
4 tool shop. He did all -- he kept all of his tools, all of his 
5 work things in there. Then there was a carport and then there 
6 was the grainery, and the fence only went to that shop. 
7 Q. Let me hand you Exhibit 5-F. 
8 THE COURT: So that my notes are correct, Ms. Housell, 
9 the — there's a tool — there's a tool shop first? 
10 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
11 THE COURT: And we're talking about those out buildings 
12 that are on the — would have been the north property line, the 
13 north side of your parents -- your grandparents' property? 
14 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
15 THE COURT: There's a tool shed first if I'm walking — 
16 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
17 THE COURT: — east, and then what — 
18 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
19 THE COURT: And then what building? 
20 THE WITNESS: Then there was a carport, a large one. 
21 They put their vehicles in there, and they had all kinds of 
22 assorted stuff in there. 
23 THE COURT: And then --
24 THE WITNESS: It had an entry way on both sides, on the 
25 back side and the front side. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Then the grainery9 
2 THE WITNESS: And then the gramery. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Again, how far back did that wooden 
4 fence go? 
5 THE WITNESS: To the tool shop, and then it would 
6 have -- it stopped there and then it came up through the other 
7 part of the yard. There was no fence on that part from the 
8 gramery to the -- I mean you couldn't put your car in the 
9 garages if there was a fence. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
11 Q. BY MR. GREENWOOD: How far back from the gramery was 
12 the Whitt barn? 
13 A. There was a big corral and then the barn; 200 feet 
14 maybe. 
15 Q. Okay. Do you remember seeing a barn on the neighbor's 
16 property, the McNaughton property? 
17 A. When I -- I don't know if I -- about a barn. Mostly 
18 what I remember about their property is the swings on the big 
19 trees over there. 
20 Q. Okay. Describe to the Court the big trees and where 
21 they are located. 
22 A. They were — there was two trees, and they had swings on 
23 them. My grandfather was very, very definite with my brother and 
24 I that we were not to climb over that fence and go swing on those 
25 trees. He said, "If you want to go swimming in the canal you go 
Tat -
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1 Q. Tell the Court how you're familiar with it. 
2 A. Well, when I was -- when I first started -- I was 
3 probably eight or nine-years-old, I used to take cows back and 
4 forth to pasture for the McNaughtons. 
5 Q. Okay. Now --
6 A. And --
7 Q. Go ahead. 
8 A. Then --
9 Q. And you worked for the McNaughtons? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. Were you aware where the Whitt property is in 
12 relation to that McNaughton property? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Yes. Did you ever take cows along the boundary between 
15 the Whitt and the McNaughton property? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Okay. Describe for the Court what you mean to be the 
18 boundary in the properties. Exhibit No. 5-A, let me hand you a 
19 photo. Can you identify what's in that photo? 
20 A. Yes. The Link McNaughton house is to the north. 
21 MR. BIRCH: May I approach, your Honor? 
22 THE COURT: Yeah. You --
23 MR. GREENWOOD: It's 5-A. 
24 MR. BIRCH: See which photo. Sorry. Thank you. 
25 Exhibit 5-A. 
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1 property. 
2 THE COURT: Where on the frontage? 
3 THE WITNESS: Just — oh, probably about 150 feet to the 
4 north. 
5 THE COURT: To the north of what? 
6 THE WITNESS: To the north of the property line. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 Q. BY MR. GREENWOOD: Was it to the north of the house to 
9 south of the house? 
10 A. North. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. That was before the house was built. 
13 Q. And after? After the house was built? 
14 A. They had — 
15 Q. Well, was the access still there after the house was 
16 built? 
17 A. Yes. Well, the trees was taken down when they built the 
18 house. 
19 Q. So the front willow trees --
20 A. But there was an iron gate there to the — well, no, 
21 first there was a wire gate to the north of the house. 
22 Q, So there was a wired gate on the front --
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. — of the house? 
25 A. Before the house was built there was a wire gate right 
-258-
1 A. Well --
2 Q. By that I mean the one on the south side. 
3 A. On the south side of the --
4 Q. On the south side of the lane. 
5 A. Of the lane over here. 
6 Q. Right. The one that's through the locusts now. 
7 A. Okay. There was an old wire fence around the house 
8 here. 
9 Q. Okay. 
10 A. And back before then there was a grainery and a storage 
11 shed, and then a wooden fence and then the barn. 
12 Q. So the wooden fence went right back to the barn? 
13 A. Yeah. 
14 Q. Okay. Did you — do you recall how far off of 6th West 
15 the barn sat or how far back it was? 
16 A. Approximately 150 feet, maybe 200. 
17 Q. Maybe 200? Okay. Do you recall how wide the lane was 
18 from the fence to the edge of the -- well, how wide the lane was? 
19 A. How wide the lane was? 
20 Q. Yeah. 
21 A. I would say, just roughly guessing, about 40 feet. 
22 MR. BIRCH: Okay. One moment, your Honor. 
23 (Counsel confers with client) 
24 MR. BIRCH: No further questions, your Honor. 
25 77/ 
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Are you able to tell the Court -- are you able to give 
what's your estimate of the distance between 6th West and 
tt barn? 
I'm just taking a guess here, 175, 150 --
Okay, but you measure off of photographs, correct? 
Yes. Well, you're asking me one that I haven't 
d, but — 
Okay. You've indicated that from 2nd -- no, from the 
y over to this northern access was about 150, right? 
Yeah, 150, 175. 
So I'm asking you how far you think it is from 6th West 
Whitt barn. 
Okay. You're talking about the center line or are you 
about the right of way? 
No, I'm talking about the road, 6th West. 
Center line? 
Sure. 
About 150, 100 -- thereabouts to this barn back here? 
Uh-huh. So you believe that the property boundary to 
this access is the same as 6th West to this barn? 
A. 
Q. 
Exhibit 
barn in 
A. 
It looks like it's pretty close. 
Okay. Are you able to see the residue of the barn in 
-- residue, that's not a good word. The remnants of the 
Exhibit 44? 
Yes, right here. | 
